Psychology of Religion and Spirituality
2013, Vol. 5, No. 2, 110–115

© 2013 American Psychological Association
1941-1022/13/$12.00 DOI: 10.1037/a0032262

"Thou Shalt Not Kill": Religious Fundamentalism, Conservatism, and Rule-Based Moral Processing

Olga Antonenko Young, Robb Willer, and Dacher Keltner
University of California, Berkeley

Moral judgments are highly influenced by religious and political ideologies. Here we propose that, in addition to shaping opinions on domain-specific issues, religious and political ideologies also entail distinct approaches to moral reasoning. Specifically, we argue that both Christian fundamentalism and political conservatism are associated with rule-based moral processing. This style of moral processing involves solving moral problems through quick and unequivocal application of previously established moral codes. We test these hypotheses by examining responses to abstract moral dilemmas that pit rule-based moral processing against more flexible consequentialist moral processing outside the political and religious arenas. Across five dilemmas, Christian fundamentalism and political conservatism were associated with the use of rule-based moral processing. Notably, both ideologies continued to predict the use of rule-based moral processing when the other was held constant, suggesting that, while correlated, each makes a unique contribution to the use of rule-based processing in solving moral dilemmas. These findings reflect and expand previous insights into the cognitive traits of political conservatives and religious fundamentalists while offering new avenues for exploring how these traits influence contested moral issues.

Keywords: religious fundamentalism, political ideology, morality

This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.

From dinner table conversations to polling booths, people are frequently called upon to make moral judgments that influence everything from everyday interaction to the foundations of our society. Moral judgments concern the interests and welfare of others (Haidt, 2003) and include considerations of how to fairly distribute valued resources, what sorts of relationships should qualify for marriage, and what rights to grant individuals over their bodies. Research shows that moral judgments are contentious and strongly polarized along religious and political lines (Pew Forum, 2008).

Scholars have employed individual preferences for orthodoxy and fundamentalism over progressivism and modernism (Hunter, 1991, 1994; Jensen, 1998) in explaining the associations between religious and political ideologies and moral judgments. An orthodox and fundamentalist worldview considers God to be the true source of morality, which is revealed to humans through religious texts; conversely a progressive and modern worldview emphasizes the agency each individual has to shape and understand morality without a transcendent source (Garvey, 1993; Hunter, 1991, 1994). Additionally, individuals who hold an orthodox worldview have a strong preference for traditional norms and practices including prescribed roles based on gender, hierarchy, and family (Hunter, 1991, 1994; Jensen, 1998).

Olga Antonenko Young, Department of Psychology, University of California, Berkeley; Robb Willer, Department of Sociology, University of California, Berkeley; Dacher Keltner, Department of Psychology, University of California, Berkeley.

Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Olga Antonenko Young, Department of Psychology, University of California, Berkeley, 4137 Tolman Hall, Berkeley, CA 94720. E-mail: oantonenko@berkeley.edu

In the United States, both Christian fundamentalists and political conservatives hold orthodox worldviews, oppose attempts to alter social conventions, and believe that traditional practices provide an inerrant guide for a stable society (Hood, Hill, & Williamson, 2005; Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski, & Sulloway, 2003). However, it remains unclear exactly how these two identities are related to moral reasoning. Here we contend that both Christian fundamentalism and political conservatism are related to a particular style of moral processing that focuses on adherence to and application of rules without exception. Religion and religious fundamentalism have previously been associated with submission and low integrative complexity (Ginges, Hansen, & Norenzayan, 2009; Hunsberger, Pratt, & Pancer, 1994; Saroglou, Corneille, & Van Cappellen, 2009). Additionally, political conservatism has been associated with a high need for closure and low tolerance of ambiguity (Jost, Kruglanski, & Simon, 1999; Sidanius, 1978). Due to their associations with somewhat different cognitive traits, we hypothesize that each identity uniquely predicts moral processing.

Morality, Politics, and Religion

Previous work in moral psychology has begun exploring the relationship between morality and both political ideology and religion. For example, Christian fundamentalists are more likely than their more moderate Christian counterparts to consider homosexuality and abortion to be breaches of morality (Guth, Smidt, Kellstedt, & Green, 1993; Layman, 1997), and tend to blame individuals, rather than unfortunate circumstances, for their underprivileged status (Pichon & Saroglou, 2009). However, while the content of specific moral judgments differs for those who are strongly fundamentalist, it is unclear whether religious fundamentalism is associated with a unique style of moral processing.

This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.

Similarly, research examining political orientation has found that conservatives and liberals differ in their conceptions of what constitutes a moral issue (Graham, Haidt, & Nosek, 2009). While individuals endorsing either ideology agree that breaches of justice and acts harming other individuals are immoral, conservatives moralize additional domains including group loyalty, respect for authority, and bodily and spiritual purity. This may explain why conservatives are more likely than liberals to consider actions such as premarital sex, opposition to war, and criticism of national leaders to be immoral actions (Haidt & Graham, 2007). We extend this important work on the content of moral judgments by investigating the process underlying these judgments. It is possible that even when conservatives and liberals agree on what constitutes a breach of morality, such as opposition to harm of innocent people, political ideology influences the processes individuals use to reach this judgment.

In the present study we examine how conservative political ideology and Christian fundamentalism shape moral processing. It is worth noting that, in the contemporary U.S., religious orientation and political ideology overlap in both their associated political values and attitudes and the composition of their adherents. For example, Conservatives are more likely than liberals to identify as evangelical Christians and to believe in the literal word of the Bible (Pew Forum, 2008). For this reason, the current investigation will examine the unique relationships of each ideology with rule-based moral processing, while controlling for the other.

Moral Processing

Novel work in moral psychology (Greene, Sommerville, Nystrom, Darley, & Cohen, 2001; Greene, Nystrom, Engell, Darley, & Cohen, 2004) borrows from a long tradition in philosophy in distinguishing between two broad styles of moral processing. A *deontological* or *rule-based approach* focuses on adhering to and applying previously established moral edicts. On the other hand, a *consequentialist approach* examines each moral situation individually and considers which action leads to the best consequences. Rule-based moral processing is more resistant to situational exceptions, such as lying in order to save someone's feelings or stealing in order to feed a family. Researchers have emphasized that these two terms not only refer to moral philosophies; they also describe *psychological natural kinds* representing two discernible psychological patterns for making moral decisions (Greene, 2007). Further, while individuals may sometimes use a combination of these philosophies, overall people show a fairly stable preference for one type of moral processing over another in their judgments of different moral situations, including ones involving lying, stealing, and harming others (Lombrozo, 2009).

To capture the predilection for rule-based versus consequentialist moral processing style, participants make judgments in moral dilemmas that pit the two against each other (Greene et al., 2009; Greene et al., 2001). For example, the "lifeboat" dilemma asks participants whether it is acceptable to push a sick individual out of a lifeboat in order to stop the lifeboat sinking, thereby saving all the other passengers on board. Because this action breaches a core moral edict against harming innocent others, deontological (i.e., rule-based) moral processing would lead an individual to judge the action impermissible. However, because the action would lead to the better consequence of saving more lives, consequentialist moral processing (i.e., flexible, event-based approach) would lead participants to deem the action permissible.

In the current study, we use similar dilemmas to explore whether religious fundamentalism and political conservatism are associated with rule-based or consequentialist moral processing. In addition to being well established in the moral psychology literature, this is preferable to using politicized moral issues such as the permissibility of abortion and same-sex unions for at least a couple of reasons. First, by focusing on dilemmas involving harm, considered to be a fundamental basis of moral judgment for both liberals and conservatives (Graham et al., 2009), we avoid the distinctions these two groups make between what is moral and what is not. Second, by using abstract dilemmas, we avoid the tendency for individuals to simply side with their political party without giving a topic serious consideration (Cohen, 2003).

While substantial literature has examined the unique social cognition of conservatives and liberals (e.g., Jost et al., 2003), to our knowledge no previous work has examined the association between political orientation and moral processing. Similarly, while some research has found no relationship between religiosity and moral processing style (Hauser, Cushman, Young, Jin, & Mikhail, 2007), the association with religious fundamentalism remains unexplored. Previous studies have found that rule-based moral processing is usually faster (Greene et al., 2004; Greene et al., 2001), requires less cognitive effort (Greene, Morelli, Lowenberg, Nystrom, & Cohen, 2008), and is more affect-laden (Greene et al., 2004; Greene et al., 2001; Valdesolo & DeSteno, 2006) than consequentialist moral processing. Further, several individual traits influence preferences for rule-based moral processing. Individuals who exhibit greater trait reliance on intuition, as opposed to deliberation, tend to make more rule-based judgments (Bartels, 2008). Similarly, better working memory is associated with less reliance on rule-based processing (Moore, Clark, & Kane, 2008). Participants with better working memory are more likely to deem it appropriate to kill an individual in order to save several others if that individual's death is inevitable. In light of these associations, we review past literature concerning cognitive traits associated with political orientation and religious fundamentalism in order to contextualize our hypotheses regarding these orientations and moral processing.

Religious Fundamentalism and Moral Processing

A substantial body of research suggests that there are differences in individuals' approaches to, and motivations toward, religion (Allport & Ross, 1967; Batson, 1976). One noteworthy distinction is the extent to which individuals take a fundamentalist stance toward religion, defined by an interpretation of Biblical texts as the literal and inarguable word of God meant to guide daily living (Altemeyer & Hunsberger, 1992, 2004).

In addition to its association with particular attitudes, such as negative views of homosexuality, preferences for traditional gender roles, and support for desecularization of schools (Altemeyer, 1996; Emerson & Hartman, 2006), several studies have linked fundamentalism with a less "open" cognitive approach to the world (Kirkpatrick, Hood, & Hartz, 1991). For example religious fundamentalism is associated with lower integrative

This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.

complexity, especially on topics concerning existential issues like life and death (Hunsberger et al., 1994). Individuals who score high on a measure of religious fundamentalism were less likely to examine and integrate more than one perspective when discussing these issues. Further, recent research has suggested that religion is associated with obedience and submission (Ginges et al., 2009; Saroglou et al., 2009). For example, individuals who are led to believe that killing is condoned by the Bible are more likely to comply with a suggestion to administer painful punishment than those who are led to believe the same actions are condoned by a secular source (Bushman, Ridge, Das, Key, & Busath, 2007).

Due to its association with lower integrative complexity and submission, we posit that religious fundamentalism is associated with a propensity for rule-based moral processing. An aversion to using multiple perspectives and a tendency to submit to religious authority may lead fundamentalists not to consider the particular details of each situation, instead applying previously established and Biblically condoned moral codes.

Political Orientation and Moral Processing

Political ideologies are organized sets of moral and political attitudes, which help individuals interpret the social world, specify how best to address life's problems, and prescribe views on specific policy issues (Jost, Federico, & Napier, 2009). In the U.S., over three quarters of the voting-aged population can place itself on a liberal−conservative continuum (Jost, 2006). Among other features, conservative political ideology is typically associated with a motivation to preserve order and clarity in the world, a need for cognitive closure, and low tolerance for ambiguity (Jost et al., 1999; Jost et al., 2003; Sidanius, 1978). Individuals with a high need for cognitive closure tend to reach firm and stable opinions on a given topic quickly and are averse to having their views confronted (Webster & Kruglanski, 1994). Similarly, individuals with a low tolerance for ambiguity are averse to information that is complex and inconsistent and to questions with no clear answer (Furnham & Ribchester, 1995).

Because of its association with preferences for clear, stable, unwavering solutions to problems, and an aversion to complex and ambiguous situations, there is good reason to expect political conservatism to also be associated with rule-based moral processing. Applying rules to a situation avoids the ambiguity and uncertainty associated with exceptions and personal opinions.

Current Study

Both religious fundamentalism and political conservatism are associated with similar, but somewhat different, cognitive traits related to rule-based processing. Political conservatives may be more likely to avoid ambiguous stimuli and to prefer certainty. Religious fundamentalists may wish to avoid examining issues from more than a single perspective and be inclined to submit to religious edicts. The study presented here will test whether religious fundamentalism and political conservatism are each uniquely associated with rule-based moral processing.

Method

Participants

Two hundred seven participants were recruited via the craigslist.org websites of 15 American cities including Raleigh, NC, Framingham, MA, Kansas City, MO, Austin, TX, Alameda, CA, San Diego, CA, and Chestertown, MD. In exchange for participation, participants were entered into a drawing for their choice of an iPod or a $50 prize. Participants were included in final analyses only if they reported Christianity as their religious identity and completed all components of the study. This left 119 participants (21 male, mean age = 37.9 years). Of these participants, 46.3% identified as Caucasian, 8.2% as Hispanic or Latino, 6.3% as Asian American, 6.3% as African American, and 2.7% as Native American.

Materials and Procedure

Participants completed all components of the study online from their homes or a location of their choice. A brief demographic questionnaire assessed various background variables including age, gender, and ethnicity. Participants also indicated the extent to which they classified themselves as liberal or conservative on a scale ranging from 1 (*extremely liberal*) to 7 (*extremely conservative*).

In order to assess religious fundamentalism, participants completed the 12-item Religious Fundamentalism Scale (Altemeyer & Hunsberger, 2004). Participants rated on a 5-point Likert their agreement with items addressing the infallibility of the Bible as well as their belief that Christianity is the one true faith. Sample items from this scale include, "Scriptures may contain general truths, but they should NOT be considered completely, literally true from beginning to end" (reverse-scored) and, "To lead the best, most meaningful life, one must belong to the one, fundamentally true religion."

In order to assess moral processing style, participants were presented with five moral dilemmas borrowed from previous research (Green et al., 2001). The full text of the dilemmas can be found in the Appendix. Each dilemma was approximately 100 words long. Participants read all five dilemmas, the order of which was randomized between participants. All dilemmas presented a scenario in which one person could be killed in order to save several others. After reading each dilemma, participants were asked how permissible it would be for them to kill the single individual on a 7-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (*very appropriate*) to 7 (*very inappropriate*). Higher scores indicated greater reliance on rule-based-moral processing.

Results

The Religious Fundamentalism (RF) Scale showed high reliability ($\alpha = .91$). Participants' mean scores on the 9-point RF scale were 6.04 ($SD = 2.07$). Participants' mean conservatism scores were 5.81 ($SD = 2.48$) on a 10-point Likert scale. Consistent with past research, there was a significant positive correlation between political conservatism and religious fundamentalism ($r = .63$, $p < .001$).

This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.

Responses to the five dilemmas showed high reliability (α = .78). Therefore, a single composite score was calculated for each participant using the mean of the five responses. Once again, a higher rule-based composite score indicated greater reliance on this type of moral processing. Participants' rule-based moral processing scores ranged from 1 to 7 with a mean of 3.13 (SD = 1.53). Neither age nor gender were significant predictors of rule-based moral processing.

Consistent with our hypotheses, a multiple regression analysis, using the rule-based composite as the dependent measure and both religious fundamentalism and political conservatism as predictors, revealed that each was positively associated with rule-based processing (B = .29, $p < .05$ and B = .20, $p < .05$, respectively). These associations remained significant after accounting for the effects of age and gender (B = .24, $p < .05$ and B = .25, $p < .05$).

Discussion

Political and religious ideologies each play a central role in guiding moral judgments for many individuals. Religious affiliations and political parties outline moral norms concerning sexuality, family structure, resource allocation, medical interventions, and other weighty issues. Americans' social and political attitudes have been deeply divided between the conservative and Christian fundamentalist views on the one hand, and more liberal political and religious orientations on the other (Hunter, 1991, 1994). However, it is unclear whether these identities influence the ways in which individuals process moral problems more abstractly. The data presented here suggest that the association between these identities and sociopolitical attitudes may be due in part to deeply seated differences in the way individuals process moral issues, and are not simply the result of social identity processes (Cohen, 2003).

Here we demonstrate that, although religious and political ideologies are substantially overlapping in the United States, each is associated with the use of rule-based moral processing in abstract moral dilemmas. Rule-based moral processing relies on preestablished codes that are seen as invariant. Using this moral processing style is fast, as it precludes exceptions to preestablished codes. Across five different hypothetical dilemmas, political conservatism and Christian fundamentalism uniquely predicted the use of rule-based moral processing.

This research extends recent work examining the influence of political orientation on moral judgments. Previous research (Graham et al., 2009) has demonstrated that liberals and conservatives focus on different concerns when considering moral issues. When judging moral transgressions, liberals focus on violations of care and justice. Conservatives additionally emphasize the values of respecting authority, being loyal to one's ingroup, and preserving purity when making moral judgments. This research highlights differences in the content of morality between liberals and conservatives. We extend these important findings by examining nuanced differences between the ways that liberals and conservatives process moral issues within the same domain. The findings here suggest that while liberals and conservatives both agree that it is important to avoid harming others, they reach specific conclusions in domains involving harm through different styles of reasoning. While conservatives consult unshakeable moral rules against harming others and apply them directly, liberals are more likely to consider specific consequences and costs and benefits of the situation when forming moral judgments.

Similarly, this work extends burgeoning research on the psychology of religion that finds an association between religion and submission to rules (Saroglou et al., 2009; Ginges et al., 2009) as well as an aversion to integrating multiple perspectives when examining existential issues (Hunsberger et al., 1994). The data presented here extend these emerging findings into the domain of moral judgments. Individuals who prefer a literal interpretation of the Bible are more likely to solve complicated moral dilemmas using unequivocal moral rules.

The association between rule-based moral processing and both Christian fundamentalism and political conservatism may operate through somewhat different mechanisms. Future research should investigate these differences. It is possible that because political conservatism has been associated with a motivation to preserve order and clarity more abstractly (Jost et al., 1999; Furnham & Ribchester, 1995), its association with rule-based moral processing is due to a desire to reach quick, stable answers to complicated dilemmas of various forms. Christian fundamentalism, on the other hand, is associated with a submission to religious codes and low motivation to integrate opposing perspectives that run counter to Biblical edicts (Saroglou et al., 2009; Ginges et al., 2009). One way to test these differences is to find moral dilemmas that have not been discussed using religious rhetoric.

Future research should also address several limitations of the current study. First, the craigslist Internet sample we employed offered an opportunity to examine the opinions of a geographically and demographically diverse population. While participants were instructed to complete the study alone, it is possible that they failed to follow directions and were influenced by others' opinions when completing the survey. Additionally, it is important that future work examine the differences and similarities between religious fundamentalists of different faiths to determine whether the current relationships extend beyond fundamentalist Christians. Lastly, while the findings here highlight an interesting and important association between moral processing and both religious and political identities, they cannot speak to the causal mechanism underlying these associations. Future research should move beyond correlational design in order to establish a better understanding of what causal processes drive the associations we observed.

References

Allport, G. W., & Ross, J. M. (1967). Personal religious orientation and prejudice. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 5,* 432–443. doi:10.1037/h0021212

Altemeyer, B. (1996). *The authoritarian specter*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Altemeyer, B., & Hunsberger, B. (1992). Authoritarianism, religious fundamentalism, quest, and prejudice. *International Journal for the Psychology of Religion, 2,* 113–133. doi:10.1207/s15327582ijpr0202_5

Altemeyer, B., & Hunsberger, B. (2004). A revised religious fundamentalism scale: The short and sweet of it. *International Journal for the Psychology of Religion, 14,* 47–54. doi:10.1207/s15327582ijpr1401_4

Bartels, D. M. (2008). Principled moral sentiment and the flexibility of moral judgments and decision making. *Cognition, 108,* 381–417. doi:10.1016/j.cognition.2008.03.001

Batson, C. D. (1976). Religion as prosocial: Agent or double agent? *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion, 15,* 29–45. doi:10.2307/1384312

Bushman, B. J., Ridge, R. D., Das, E., Key, C. W., & Busath, G. L. (2007). When God sanctions killing. *Psychological Science, 18,* 204–207. doi:10.1111/j.1467-9280.2007.01873.x

Cohen, G. L. (2003). Party over policy: The dominating impact of group influence on political beliefs. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 85,* 808–822. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.85.5.808

Emerson, M. O., & Hartman, D. (2006). The rise of religious fundamentalism. *Annual Review of Sociology, 32,* 127–144. doi:10.1146/annurev.soc.32.061604.123141

Furnham, A., & Ribchester, T. (1995). Tolerance of ambiguity: A review of the concept, its measurement, and application. *Current Psychology, 14,* 179–199. doi:10.1007/BF02686907

Garvey, J. H. (1993). Fundamentalism and politics. In M. E. Marty & R. S. Appleby (Eds.), *Fundamentalism and the state* (pp. 13–27). Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press.

Ginges, J., Hansen, I., & Norenzayan, A. (2009). Religion and support for suicide attacks. *Psychological Science, 20,* 224–230. doi:10.1111/j.1467-9280.2009.02270.x

Graham, J., Haidt, J., & Nosek, B. A. (2009). Liberals and conservatives rely on different sets of moral foundations. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 96,* 1029–1046. doi:10.1037/a0015141

Greene, J. D. (2007). The secret joke of Kant's soul. In W. Sinnott-Armstrong (Ed.), *Moral psychology Vol. 3: The Neuroscience of morality: Emotion, disease, and development* (pp. 105–118). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Greene, J. D., Cushman, F. A., Stewart. L. E., Lowenberg, K., Nystrom, L. E., & Cohen, J. D. (2009). Pushing moral buttons: The interaction between personal force and intention in moral judgment. *Cognition, 111,* 364–371. doi:10.1016/j.cognition.2009.02.001

Greene, J. D., Morelli, S. A., Lowenberg, K., Nystrom, L. E., & Cohen, J. D. (2008). Cognitive load selectively interferes with utilitarian moral judgment. *Cognition, 107,* 1144–1154. doi:10.1016/j.cognition.2007.11.004

Greene, J. D., Nystrom, L. E., Engell, A. D., Darley, J. M., & Cohen, J. D. (2004). The neural bases of cognitive conflict and control in moral judgment. *Neuron, 44,* 389–400. doi:10.1016/j.neuron.2004.09.027

Greene, J. D., Sommerville, R. B., Nystrom, L. E., Darley, J. M., & Cohen, J. D. (2001). An fMRI investigation of emotional engagement in moral judgment. *Science, 293,* 2105–2108. doi:10.1126/science.1062872

Guth, J. L., Smidt, C. E., Kellstedt, L. A., & Green, J. C. (1993). The sources of antiabortion attitudes: The case of religious political activists. *American Politics Research, 21,* 65–80. doi:10.1177/1532673X9302100105

Haidt, J. (2003). The moral emotions. In R. J. Davidson, K. R. Scherer, & H. H. Goldsmith (Eds.), *Handbook of affective sciences* (pp. 852–870). Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.

Haidt, J., & Graham, J. (2007). When morality opposes justice: Conservatives have moral intuitions that liberals may not recognize. *Social Justice Research, 20,* 98–116. doi:10.1007/s11211-007-0034-z

Hauser, M., Cushman, F., Young, L., Jin, R. K. X., & Mikhail, J. (2007). A dissociation between moral judgments and justifications. *Mind & Language, 22,* 1–21.

Hood, R. W., Hill, P. C., & Williamson, W. P. (2005). *The psychology of religious fundamentalism*. New York, NY: Guilford.

Hunsberger, B., Pratt, M., & Pancer, S. M. (1994). Religious fundamentalism and integrative complexity of thought: A relationship for existential content only? *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion, 33,* 335–346. doi:10.2307/1386493

Hunter, J. D. (1991). *Culture wars: The struggle to define America*. New York, NY: Basic Books.

Hunter, J. D. (1994). *Before the shooting begins: Searching for democracy in America's culture war*. New York, NY: Free Press.

Jensen, L. A. (1998). Moral divisions within countries between orthodoxy and progressivism: India and the United States. *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion, 37,* 90–107. doi:10.2307/1388031

Jost, J. T. (2006). The end of the end of ideology. *American Psychologist, 61,* 651–670. doi:10.1037/0003-066X.61.7.651

Jost, J. T., Federico, C. M., & Napier, J. L. (2009). Political ideology: Its structure, functions, and elective affinities. *Annual Review of Psychology, 60,* 307–337. doi:10.1146/annurev.psych.60.110707.163600

Jost, J. T., Glaser, J., Kruglanski, A. W., & Sulloway, F. J. (2003). Political conservativism as motivated social cognition. *Psychological Bulletin, 129,* 339–375. doi:10.1037/0033-2909.129.3.339

Jost, J. T., Kruglanski, A. W., & Simon, L. (1999). Effects of epistemic motivation on conservatism, intolerance, and other system justifying attitudes. In L. Thompson, D. M. Messick, & J. M. Levine (Eds.), *Shared cognition in organizations: The management of knowledge* (pp. 91–116). Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum.

Kirkpatrick, L. A., Hood, R. W., & Hartz, J. G. (1991). Fundamentalist religion conceptualized in terms of Rokeach's theory of the open and closed mind: New perspectives on some old ideas. In M. Lynn & D. Moberg, (Eds.), *Research in the social scientific study of religion* (pp. 157–179). Greenwich, CT: JAI Press.

Layman, G. C. (1997). Religion and political behavior in the United States: The impact of beliefs, affiliations, and commitment from 1980 to 1994. *Public Opinion Quarterly, 61,* 288–316. doi:10.1086/297796

Lombrozo, T. (2009). The role of moral commitments in moral judgment. *Cognitive Science, 33,* 273–286. doi:10.1111/j.1551-6709.2009.01013.x

Moore, A. B., Clark, B. A., & Kane, M. J. (2008). Who shalt not kill?: Individual differences in working memory capacity, executive control, and moral judgment. *Psychological Science, 19,* 549–557. doi:10.1111/j.1467-9280.2008.02122.x

Pew Forum on Religion & Public Life. (2008). *U.S. Religious Landscape Survey: Summary of key findings*. Retrieved from http://religions.pewforum.org/pdf/report2religious-landscape-study-key-findings.pdf

Pichon, I., & Saroglou, V. (2009). Religion and helping: Impact of target thinking styles and just-world beliefs. *Archive for the Psychology of Religion, 31,* 215–236. doi:10.1163/157361209X424466

Saroglou, V., Corneille, O., & Van Cappellen, P. (2009). "Speak, Lord, Your Servant Is Listening": Religious priming activates submissive thoughts and behaviors. *International Journal for the Psychology of Religion, 19,* 143–154. doi:10.1080/10508610902880063

Sidanius, J. (1978). Intolerance of ambiguity and socio-politico ideology: A multidimensional analysis. *European Journal of Social Psychology, 8,* 215–235. doi:10.1002/ejsp.2420080207

Valdesolo, P., & DeSteno, D. (2006). Manipulations of emotional context shape moral judgment. *Psychological Science, 17,* 476–477. doi:10.1111/j.1467-9280.2006.01731.x

Webster, D. M., & Kruglanski, A. W. (1994). Individual differences in need for cognitive closure. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 67,* 1049–1062. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.67.6.1049

This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.

Appendix

Text of the Dilemmas Used in This Study

1. You are the captain of a military submarine traveling underneath a large iceberg. An onboard explosion has caused you to lose most of your oxygen supply and has injured one of your crew who is quickly losing blood. The injured crewmember is going to die from his wounds no matter what happens.

The remaining oxygen is not sufficient for the entire crew to make it to the surface. The only way to save the other crewmembers is to shoot dead the injured crewmember so that there will be just enough oxygen for the rest of the crew to survive.

Is it appropriate for you to kill the fatally injured crewmember in order to save the lives of the remaining crew members?

2. You are the leader of a small group of soldiers. You are on your way back from a completed mission deep in enemy territory when one of your men has stepped in trap that has been set by the enemy and is badly injured. The trap is connected to a radio device that by now has alerted the enemy to your presence. They will soon be on their way.

If the enemy finds your injured man they will torture him and kill him. He begs you not to leave him behind, but if you try to take him with you your entire group will be captured. The only way to prevent this injured soldier from being tortured is to shoot him yourself.

Is it appropriate for you to shoot the soldier in the head to prevent him from being tortured?

3. You are on a cruise ship when there is a fire on board and the ship has to be abandoned. The lifeboats are carrying many more people than they were designed to carry. The lifeboat you're in is sitting dangerously low in the water—a few inches lower and it will sink.

The seas start to get rough, and the boat begins to fill with water. If nothing is done it will sink before the rescue boats arrive and everyone on board will die. However, there is an injured person who will not survive in any case. If you throw that person overboard the boat will stay afloat and the remaining passengers will be saved.

Is it appropriate for you to throw this person overboard in order to save the lives of the remaining passengers?

4. You are negotiating with a powerful and determined terrorist who is about to set off a bomb in a crowded area. Your one advantage is that you have his teenage son in your custody.

There is only one thing that you can do to stop him from detonating his bomb, which will kill thousands of people if detonated. To stop him, you must contact him over the satellite hook-up that he has established and, in front of the camera, break one of his son's arms and then threaten to break the other one if he does not give himself up.

Is it appropriate for you to break the terrorist's son's arm in order to prevent the terrorist from killing thousands of people with his bomb?

5. A runaway trolley is heading down the tracks toward five workmen who will be killed if the trolley proceeds on its present course. You are on a footbridge over the tracks, in between the approaching trolley and the five workmen. Next to you on this footbridge is a stranger who happens to be very large.

The only way to save the lives of the five workmen is to push this stranger off the bridge and onto the tracks below where his large body will stop the trolley. The stranger will die if you do this, but the five workmen will be saved.

Is it appropriate for you to push the stranger on to the tracks in order to save the five workmen?

Received February 7, 2012
Revision received October 8, 2012
Accepted October 11, 2012 ■

This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.