Group Dynamics:
Theory, Research, and Practice

© 2023 American Psychological Association
ISSN: 1089-2699

2023, Vol. 27, No. 4, 229–256
https://doi.org/10.1037/gdn0000207

GROUP PSYCHOLOGIST OF THE YEAR AWARD

Socially Shared Affect: Shared Affect, Affect Sharing, and Affective Processing in Groups

Verlin B. Hinsz[1] and Linh Bui[2]

[1] Department of Psychology, North Dakota State University

[2] Research School of Management, College of Business and Economics, The Australian National University

Objective: This review explores groups as affective processing social entities. We examine the reciprocal relationships between socially shared affect and the affective experiences of group members such as moods and emotions. ***Method:*** The review applies a unifying theme of social sharedness to consider affective processes in group settings which are demonstrated with shared affect (e.g., affect convergence) and affect sharing (e.g., contagion). Several group topics related to socially shared affect are discussed such as group cohesiveness, shared affect norms, task interdependence, member stability, leadership, and group effectiveness. ***Results:*** The sharedness of affective experiences of group members can be arrayed along three dimensions: affective events, affective states, and affective appraisals. Each of these dimensions is described for its relevance to socially shared affect, which is illustrated with shared affective appraisals incorporating shared awareness, shared sensemaking and shared representations of affect. The examination of socially shared affect highlights a number of patterns of relationships including shared affect and affect sharing biases in which groups process affect in ways that exaggerates the typical affective responses of group members. Many of these patterns can be appreciated by carefully examining the distributional characteristics of group member affective responses. ***Conclusion:*** This review provides insights gained from examining socially shared affect with a focus on how affective experiences are shared and are being shared in groups. This review generates implications for the vast assortment of group settings in general, while illustrating socially shared affect with teams in organizations and group psychotherapy as examples.

Highlights and Implications

- The affective experiences of group members are shown to be socially shared in that the affect is shared (held in common) as well as being shared (exchanged) among members.
- The degree that group members share affective experiences similarly can be described in terms of the affective events that lead to changes in affect, the

Editor's Note. The Arthur Teicher Group Psychologist of the Year Award is given by Division 49 of the American Psychological Association (Society for Group Psychology and Group Psychotherapy) to honor a distinguished group psychologist whose theory, research or practice has made an important contribution to our knowledge of group behavior. In 2022 the award was given to Verlin B. Hinsz, Ph.D.

This article was published Online First October 26, 2023.

Verlin B. Hinsz https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5386-8845

This article was informed by numerous discussions about affect with Michael D. Robinson, Guihyun Park, Nick Wang, Ernest Park, and reviewer comments.

Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Verlin B. Hinsz, Department of Psychology, North Dakota State University, Fargo, ND 58108-6050, United States. Email: Verlin.Hinsz@NDSU.edu

This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.

affective states such as moods and emotions that members experience, and the way the affect is appraised or interpreted by group members.
- Patterns of relationships are demonstrated including shared affect and affect sharing biases in which groups exaggerate affective processing such that group members have enhanced or diminished affect resulting from socially sharing their affective experiences.
- The degree that affective experiences are shared and are being shared among group members has dramatic impact on group functioning, cohesiveness, and effectiveness.
- Implications apply for most group settings as shown with teams in organizations and group psychotherapy.

Keywords: affect, group, team, mood, emotion

This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.

Affect is inherent to group life, with affective processes being critical for group functioning (Arrow et al., 2000; Ilies et al., 2007; Tiedens et al., 2004; van Kleef et al., 2017). Affective processes facilitate group integration (Knight & Eisenkraft, 2015), coordinate group members' collective effort (van Kleef & Fischer, 2016), regulate members' affective experiences (R. J. Larsen, 2000), and fulfill group members' needs to connect with others (Niedenthal & Brauer, 2012). Groups are interdependent and interactive systems whereby member affective experience is not independent, but shared among group members (Park & Hinsz, 2015). Importantly, the degree that affect is shared among group members enhances or diminishes the influence of that affect on group functioning and effectiveness (Hinsz, 2009). We build on prior literature to draw attention to how the processes associated with socially shared affect can contribute to our understanding of groups as affective processing social entities.[1]

In this article, we focus upon affective states and affective processes in intact groups who interact face-to-face. We follow tradition to consider groups as having two or more members who influence each other through social interaction, share similar task goals, and consider themselves a group (Forsyth, 2018; McGrath, 1984). Our discussion focuses on the shared experience of affect that group members collectively possess and process through social interactions (Menges & Kilduff, 2015; Spoor & Kelly, 2004). Importantly, we use shared and sharing to relate to social conditions in which affect is considered in groups.

Social sharedness is a key theme of information processing in groups (Tindale & Kameda, 2000), which is also relevant for affective processing in groups in that groups involve socially shared affect, paralleling the notion of socially shared cognition (Nye & Brower, 1996). Critical for understanding many of the affective processes associated with groups is the distinction between the two forms of sharedness in groups: "shared" (held in common) and "sharing" (exchanged or transferred). This distinction leads to notions of shared affect and affect sharing, and related affective processes (e.g., by sharing affect in groups, the affect in groups becomes shared). This article expands on these notions to consider how shared affect, affect sharing, and the social processing of affect are essential features of groups (Hinsz, 2009).

This article will elaborate on a variety of features of affective processing in groups. Initially, we will discuss shared affect (e.g., affective convergence), followed by affect sharing (e.g., contagion). This will be followed by providing some organization noting that affect in groups can be shared and is shared along three dimensions of affective experience: the event(s) that stimulates the affect, the affective state experienced, and the appraisal of the affective experience. Shared affect and affect sharing are then linked to some group topics associated with the social sharing of affect in groups (e.g., cohesiveness, norms). The insights and implications from this review are discussed with special attention to shared affect and affect sharing

[1] There have been important reviews of the role and impact of affect in groups (e.g., Barsade & Gibson, 1998; Barsade & Knight, 2015; Elfenbein, 2007, 2023; Kelly & Barsade, 2001; Menges & Kilduff, 2015; Niedenthal & Brauer, 2012; Spoor & Kelly, 2004).

biases, distributional characteristics of affective responses in groups, the generic nature of socially shared affect in group settings, and the complexity of experiencing multiple and mixed feelings simultaneously by group members and among group members. This article concludes with some questions providing future directions for considering socially shared affect and groups as affective processing social entities.

Before discussing affect in groups, we want to clarify a few key affective terms. Affect is used as an umbrella term to cover a number of concepts such as mood, emotion, affective states, and dispositional affect (Barsade & Gibson, 1998; Watson, 2000). Researchers often distinguish between mood and emotion. Emotions are affective states generally triggered by events in the environment. Emotions are generally perceived as discrete and distinguishable by those experiencing them (e.g., fear vs. anger vs. surprise). Also, responses to the emotionally eliciting stimuli have unique behavioral signatures (e.g., avoidance to fear, approach to anger). Emotions are intense feelings that arise from known causes. Because emotions convey important information, they can be socially shared as signals to others (van Kleef, 2009). In contrast, moods reflect positive and negative affective states that are more diffuse and seem to be unconnected from obvious origins. Mood states emerge and decay relatively slowly whereas emotions start and end relatively quickly (Watson, 2000). As affective states, both moods and emotions routinely occur in social settings such as groups. Thus, these affective states have important consequences for group life.

Shared Affect

Shared affect is a key aspect of how we feel in groups. There is a common, shared affect, reflecting the homogeneity of affective experiences in groups. Shared affect is the degree that group members are similar in their affective experience. A group that is high in shared affect is one in which group members' affect is similar, homogeneous, and consistent. In contrast, group members with low shared affect display variations in their affect. Many terms can be used to reflect this degree of similarity, homogeneity, and consistency such as convergence, agreement, uniform, invariant, congruence, and held in common. Moreover, other terms reflect the processes by which affect becomes shared among group members, such as convergence, synchronization, harmonize, contagion, uniformity pressures, homogenization, agreement, normalization, and interdependence. These processes imply that the social interaction of groups results in greater shared affect among members.

The Analysis and Specification of Shared Affect

As a state of sharedness, it is notable that the degree of shared affect is measurable. Researchers can measure and index the aggregate degree of shared affect by calculating the relationships among group members in their levels of affect. These can be shown by the within-group agreement of group members' affect ratings (e.g., interrater agreement r_{wg}; LeBreton & Senter, 2008). Similarly, the correlation between two group members' affective states can be calculated (e.g., Anderson et al., 2003). Taking the set of group members' intercorrelations on measures of affect can be calculated as the intraclass correlation (ICC; Shrout & Fleiss, 1979). Consequently, an important feature of shared affect is that it can be measured and indexed with established statistical procedures.

The measure of shared affect reflects a continuum representing the magnitude of commonality or sharedness (e.g., completely unshared, low, moderate, high, and completely shared; LeBreton & Senter, 2008). Affect is completely unshared when the value of the index is 0.0. In that case, all group members report their feelings differently regarding kinds of feelings or intensity (e.g., some members feel angry while others feel fear; members' surprise ratings range inconsistently from 1 to 7 on a response scale). Affect is completely shared when the value of the index equals 1.0. In that case, all group members report experiencing the same feeling with the same level of intensity (e.g., all group members rate their disgust as a five).

The capability of measuring the degree of shared affect also has implications for the definition and conceptualization of affect in groups. Much like the literature on socially shared cognition (e.g., Nye & Brower, 1996), defining and specifying a key socially shared affect construct is dependent upon as well as

This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.

informs the construct's measurement (e.g., shared mental models; Hinsz, 1995a). This is particularly the case because of the confusion among group-level, collective, aggregate, shared, and cross-level affective constructs. We are concerned with shared affect in groups, but this is an aggregate and cross-level construct, not a group-level one (cf. team emotion; Wang et al., 2023). Shared affect is an aggregate because it involves combining the responses of group members and determining the level of interrelationship among those affective responses. Shared affect is cross-level because it is based on member responses, but those responses are interdependent within a group with mutual influence between individual group members. Consequently, shared affect can be specified as some aggregate level of affect in a group (e.g., mean negative affect; Park & Hinsz, 2015), the variance of the member ratings regarding that affective state, and the degree of interdependence among the member ratings for that affective state (e.g., ICC of positive affect ratings; Park & Hinsz, 2015).

Shared affect is a property of affect in groups, but it is not group affect. Because an index of the degree of shared affect can be calculated, it is possible to observe different levels of shared affect among groups or among samples of groups. This index of shared affect is useful for a number of research topics regarding affect in groups (e.g., group cohesiveness) because it indicates the homogeneity and interdependence of group member affective responses. Moreover, a measure of central tendency can be used to indicate an aggregate value of those affective responses. The average level of shared affective responses and index of shared affect provide information about cross-level effects associated with the affective responses in the groups which would contribute to multilevel modeling analyses to address research questions (e.g., Kozlowski & Klein, 2000). Even with the high level of homogeneity among the group member affective responses ($r_{wg} \geq .70$), this would be considered a shared affect construct, not a group-level affect construct (Tiedens et al., 2004). A group-level construct happens as a unitary (group) construct, not one that is an aggregate of member responses. The aggregate affective responses in a group should not be attributed to the group, but does reflect the shared nature of those affective responses which is attributable to the commonality of the group member affective responses.

Group Formation and Interaction Influences on Shared Affect

Some of the processes by which affect among group members becomes increasingly shared are inherent to group formation and interaction. Early conceptualizations note that groups provide their members a social reality with which to understand their experiences (Festinger, 1950). A shared social reality provides group members an understanding of the shared affective experience. This shared social reality buttresses group members' relational motivation for shared affect (Echterhoff et al., 2009) manifested as the need to affiliate and bond with others (Baumeister & Leary, 1995), while activating pressures toward uniformity that accompany group formation and interaction. This shared social reality reflects as well as interprets what a group shares: a social setting in which group members are interdependent, have common elements such as goals, tasks, interpersonal interaction, and group membership. This common group setting provides ample opportunities for affect to be elicited and shared through group interactions (Kelly & Barsade, 2001).

There are also epistemic motivations for shared affect among group members (Echterhoff et al., 2009; Wolf et al., 2023). Epistemic motivation reflects the need to achieve valid and reliable meanings of the world (Hardin & Higgins, 1996). Having a valid and reliable understanding of the world enhances group members' capability to predict the somewhat uncertain affective aspects of the environment as well as having more confidence in dealing with that uncertainty (Festinger, 1954). By sharing affect and having shared affect with other group members, members can socially validate their feelings, compare and contrast their affect, and seek social approval about what they feel. Imagine a group of soldiers feeling fear when their group is overwhelmingly and brutally attacked. The shared fear among the soldiers confirms that other group members also feel fear, demonstrating that the fear is reliable, and validates that the situation is indeed threatening. The soldiers have a socially shared affective reality. If the soldiers do not share fear, the group members display low shared fear, then group members would have fewer cues to infer and interpret the situation, and may question their feeling of threat. The socially shared affective reality in groups can thus be influenced by both

This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.

This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.

the relational and epistemic motivations that are inherent to group formation and interaction. Moreover, because groups exist in different social realities, they can have wide variations in shared affect, but all resulting from underlying affective processes of groups.

The enhanced commonality of affect results from group formation and interaction. Research also demonstrates that the anticipation of interaction or group formation can produce uniformity (Hinsz, 1992; Paulus & Murdoch, 1971). Therefore, in anticipation of joining or becoming a member of a group, group members might modify their affect so that it would assimilate to the group norm for affect. Shared affect assists in defining the group as a social unit (Niedenthal & Brauer, 2012). As group members gain a sense of belongingness to a group, they are likely to anticipate affective homogeneity with other members of a group. Shared affect also enhances social bonding in groups (Spoor & Kelly, 2004). When group members consider themselves as a part of the group, they feel connected to the group and expect to coordinate with group members to pursue shared goals (Arrow et al., 2000). Shared positive affect helps group members develop a sense of attachment to a group (Hentschel et al., 2013; C. W. Lin et al., 2014) and feel that they are in a group (Niedenthal & Brauer, 2012). In contrast, internal negative stimuli lead to negative perceptions among group members about their groups, and if the negative affect is shared, group disintegration could result (Knight & Eisenkraft, 2015).

Group identity research indicates that mere categorization of a set of individuals as a group leads the members to be perceived as homogeneous (Simon & Pettigrew, 1990) as well as likely to act similarly (Hogg et al., 1995). There are good conceptual reasons to believe that members would also feel more alike as a function of mere categorization based on anticipated group membership (e.g., Thompson & Fine, 1999). Inducing positive affect triggers group members' to self-categorize group membership and establish group unity (Mackie & Smith, 2015). Moreover, shared positive affect, such as group pride (Zander & Armstrong, 1972), group ecstasy and awe (Heise & O'Brien, 1993), can build the sense of group identity. Although negative affect is seen as detrimental to group identification (Hentschel et al., 2013; C. Lin et al., 2017), there is evidence that experiencing negative affective states (e.g., fear, sadness, and grief) can enhance perception of similarity, facilitating social solidarity (Niedenthal & Brauer, 2012; Schachter, 1959).

Anticipating as well as being a group member interacting with other group members provides implicit and explicit reasons for group members to believe as well as desire to have a similar affect that appears as shared affect in groups. This shared affect is an antecedent as well as a consequence of the group identity, social bonding, and sense of belongingness that members experience in groups. The processes of homogenization that are inherent as a function of group formation and interaction are applicable to affect as well as cognition and behavior. Therefore, there is a reduction in variance among group members' affective responses as a function of their group interaction (e.g., Park & Hinsz, 2015). An intriguing process contributing to shared affect is how the sharing of affect in groups results in shared affect. It is the processes of affect sharing in group settings that we consider next.

Affect Sharing

Affect sharing is the dynamic processes, whereby affect is shared among group members (Barsade & Gibson, 1998). Affect sharing involves the distribution, exchange, communication, and transfer of affect among group members. Affect sharing can involve the processes of expression and communication of affect between individuals or within a group (Rimé, 2009). Research suggests that when people experience affect, they feel the need to communicate with other people about their experience, that is, socially share affect (Rimé, 2009). Thus, social sharedness is evident in that affect sharing involves a social sharing of affect. Being exposed to social sharing of emotion leads listeners to engage in reciprocal disclosure of emotion (e.g., Nils & Rimé, 2012) and share such emotion with new targets (e.g., Christophe & Rimé, 1997; Curci & Bellelli, 2004). The affect sharing process can be conveyed through nonverbal and verbal cues, body language, tone and rhythm of voice, facial expression, written scripts, or digital messages (e.g., Bazarova et al., 2015). The social sharing of affect informs group members about the current conditions of other group members, offering a powerful tool to update

shared knowledge of their group (Rimé et al., 2011).

Affect sharing relates to two social functions in interpersonal relationships: social communication and strengthening positive social relationships (Fisher & Manstead, 2016; Manstead, 2010; Niedenthal & Brauer, 2012). Affect sharing involves social communication by processes such as actively seeking affective information from others and expressing appropriate affective responses (Parkinson, 2012; Sorce et al., 1985). Specifically, affective expressions convey information about individuals' motivation, attitudes, and behaviors, which generate appropriate reactions in perceivers (Hareli & Rafaeli, 2008). For example, organizational team members reported more positive affective reactions and favorable inferences about their performance when leaders expressed happiness rather than anger (van Kleef et al., 2009). In group psychotherapy, clients benefit by sharing their thoughts and feelings with other group members (Yalom & Leszcz, 2020). Therapy groups encourage and require group members to express their affective experiences and use affective exchange as a means for reflection and learning (Vinogradov & Yalom, 1990).

Affect sharing also functions to strengthen social relationships (Fisher & Manstead, 2016). Research on group psychotherapy suggests that when group members share positive affect (e.g., joy, happiness, compassion, gratitude), the group members are more likely to feel a sense of belonging, safety, and stronger social bonds within the group (Yalom & Leszcz, 2020). When asked their motives for socially sharing their emotions with others, respondents indicated they sought social support and close relationships with others (Duprez et al., 2015). Similarly, receiving attention, empathy, and support from listeners enhances liking for them (Nils & Rimé, 2012). This affect sharing fosters affective synchrony which is linked to enhanced affiliation and strengthening of social relationships among group members (Cheong et al., 2020; Mogan et al., 2017). In contrast, research has found that emotional suppression decreases rapport and inhibits relationship formation (e.g., Butler et al., 2003; Gross & John, 2003). Therefore, affect sharing facilitates group interactions and effectiveness by strengthening the interpersonal relationships among group members essential to taskwork and teamwork (Salas et al., 2015) and can do so in mutual reciprocity.

Some prosocial affective states such as compassion, sympathy, and gratitude, promote positive social relationships through affect sharing (Fischer & Manstead, 2008). Repayment in kindness is one of the norms in reciprocal altruism that facilitates the exchange of prosocial affect (Stellar et al., 2017). That is, recipients are likely to reciprocate compassion, sympathy, and gratitude to givers, thus maintaining and reinforcing positive relationships (e.g., Bui et al., 2022; Crocker & Canevello, 2008). Furthermore, affective reciprocity can spread beyond two people in direct exchanges to include third parties who were not involved in the original exchange (Nowak & Sigmund, 2005). For example, the recipient of compassion from an external agent (e.g., supervisor, advisor, consultant) can reciprocate with compassion toward other group members which can ultimately, indirectly benefit the giver (Trivers, 1971). Reciprocal affective processes are also associated with two more processes that receive extensive attention in the literature: emotion contagion and affect convergence.

Affective and Emotion Contagion

Affective contagion is the transfer of affect from one person to another (Barsade, 2002). Affective and emotion contagion are unique affective processes because they are by definition social in nature and exemplars of socially shared affect. Emotion contagion is when specific emotions held and expressed by one person are assimilated by another such as among group members (Elfenbein, 2014). Primitive emotional contagion is a primarily unconscious form of contagion in which people mimic another's nonverbal displays of emotion (e.g., vocal, facial, gestural expressions) and experience those similar emotions through afferent feedback (i.e., physiological feedback from vocal, facial, and gestural movements; Hatfield et al., 1994, 2014). Other forms of emotion contagion need not be fully unconscious such as contagious laughter (Provine, 1992). Nevertheless, emotion contagion involves affect sharing in which an emotion is transferred to others after which the emotion is shared.

Research on affect in interpersonal relationships, collectives, and groups indicates that

This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.

This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.

social comparison and empathy are additional explanations for conscious affective contagion (Menges & Kilduff, 2015). In social comparison processes, people consider how others in the interaction feel to determine their own affective state (Schachter, 1959; Sullins, 1991). Empathy requires people to imagine being in the same circumstance and having as well as experiencing the same feeling of another person (Hoffman, 1985). In these forms of affective contagion, there is a movement or assimilation of the affective state by one member to the affective state of another member. Subsequently, the rated affective state should be similar for the members, which would produce a shift in mean ratings of the affective state from prior to the contagion process. Additionally, because the members share an affective state after contagion, the group will have a reduction in variance in affective state ratings. Consequently, affective and emotional contagion involves processes that directly impact the distributional qualities of rated affective states.

Research in both field and laboratory settings provide empirical evidence of affective and emotion contagion among group members (e.g., Barsade, 2002; Bartel & Saavedra, 2000; Ilies et al., 2007; Totterdell, 2000; Totterdell et al., 1998) as well as between leaders and followers (e.g., Bono & Ilies, 2006; Johnson, 2008; Sy & Choi, 2013). For example, Sy et al. (2005) found that teams with leaders who were given a positive affect induction were likely to express positive affect, while a leader induced to have negative affect resulted in teams experiencing more negative affect. Affective and emotion contagion can be particularly dramatic in therapy groups in which group members empathize, relate, and identify with the feelings being shared by other group members, and may mimic other members' feelings such as crying (Yalom & Leszcz, 2020). This contagion can be distressing for group members who become overwhelmed from assimilating the emotional experiences of others and are unable to manage the emotions or their contagion; such group members may choose to quit the group as a result (MacKenzie, 1990).

Field studies of professional cricket players, nurses, and financial accountants found a significant association between team members' rated affect and the average rated affect of the rest of the team members (Totterdell, 2000; Totterdell et al., 1998). This association was greater when team members engaged in collective activities and for team members who had dispositional sensitivity to affective contagion (Totterdell, 2000). Barsade (2002) had students work on group tasks with confederates who displayed either pleasant or unpleasant affect through eye contact, smiling, voice tone, and postures. Barsade used minute-by-minute segments to track affect in group members' self-reports and from coding members' affect and affective expressions (e.g., facial expressions, nonverbal language, voice tone). Barsade found that members who interacted with pleasant confederates displayed more positive affect than those with unpleasant confederates. The results reviewed help to demonstrate affective contagion with various methods, group settings, and temporal assessments.

It is useful to compare affect sharing and affective and emotional contagion. Whereas affect sharing may require group structures and time to process, affective and emotional contagion can occur quickly and in early interactions among group members when they are exposed to other group members' affective cues. Affect sharing may need verbal or/and nonverbal cues with consciousness (e.g., Rimé, 2009), whereas nonverbal cues and unconsciousness are often foundational for emotion contagion (e.g., Hatfield et al., 1994). Notably, when affective and emotional contagion is high in groups, affect processing in groups is likely to be marked by affect sharing among members, with shared affect likely to emerge (Bartel & Saavedra, 2000; Delvaux et al., 2016; Ilies et al., 2007). Thus, affective and emotional contagion are socially influenced affect sharing (Elfenbein, 2014; Heerdink et al., 2013).

Affect Convergence

Affect convergence is the dynamic process whereby group members' affect homogenizes and adjusts to become similar over time (Menges & Kilduff, 2015). The interdependence, coordination, and collaboration processes during group interaction provide opportunities for group members to adjust their affect such that it converges (Kozlowski & Klein, 2000). Affect convergence may occur through a process of entrainment, whereby group members adjust their interactions to become synchronized with one another and to changes in the external

environment (Ancona & Chong, 1996; Harrison et al., 2003; Kelly & McGrath, 1985; Parkinson, 2020). When group members interact, they can display affective stimuli to others such as verbal and nonverbal affective expressions. In this fashion, group members can catch (assimilate) the other members' affect (Totterdell, 2000) and adjust their own affect to match that of other members. As a result, group members may demonstrate a pattern of common affective states, rhythms, and tempo over time.

Parkinson (2020) proposed that a key process driving affect convergence is when people intentionally calibrate their affect to synchronize with each other's affect within a group. Affective entrainment can also be established through a group's synchronization to respond to external forces (McGrath, 1991). These external forces can produce disruptions for a group such as a change in tasks, a crisis from the situation, a change in membership, or a threat from opponents. Such disruptions will produce commensurate changes in groups' internal rhythms and affective states in reaction to the disruptions (Harrison et al., 2003).

Groups can switch back and forth between different rhythms to make progress on their tasks over time (Zellmer-Bruhn et al., 2004). Similarly, some affective stimuli are external forces that require team adaptation in which the members coordinate and readjust their internal team affective rhythms (Munyon & Summers, 2023). For example, after a low score in the first half of a match, which triggers convergent negative affect among team members, the team can become determined to improve their play, helping the team win the match during the second half. As such, group members' affect will converge when groups entrain their internal affective rhythms to respond to external forces.

The temporal dynamics inherent in entrainment suggests that affect convergence takes time to develop and continues to change over time. For example, Park and Hinsz (2015) showed that the homogeneity in positive and negative affect increased when group members interacted over time (e.g., ICC values of positive affect increased from 0.14 prior group task to 0.20 post group task). Delvaux et al. (2015) found that group members' anger and gratitude increasingly converged over the course of 13 weeks (e.g., ICC values of anger increased from 0.15 in Week 2 to 0.39 in Week 13). Consequently, it is important to recognize that affect convergence is both temporal and dynamic, and that it can occur for affective states and for affective processes.

Social influence in groups also promotes affect convergence. Group members tend to allow social influence to affect their moods and emotions because they want to gain the acceptance of group members (Goffman, 1969) and obtain social information (e.g., other group members' feelings; Schachter, 1959) to regulate their feelings (Hareli & Rafaeli, 2008). As noted earlier, group members have epistemic and relational motivations to seek shared affect (Echterhoff et al., 2009). Both normative (relational) and informative (epistemic) needs push group members to accept and conform to the majority of affect expressed in their groups, resulting in a similarity of affect among group members (Wolf et al., 2023). These social and informational forces contribute to the development of social norms regarding affect in groups as well as facilitate group members' application of those norms during group interactions (Kelly & Barsade, 2001).

In group psychotherapy, the development of shared agreements among therapists and clients can contribute to affect convergence. A therapeutic alliance reflects an agreement between therapists and group members on therapy goals and to cooperate in pursuit of those goals (e.g., Atzil-Slonim et al., 2015; Coyne et al., 2018; Piper et al., 2005). Implicit to the therapeutic alliance is that the affective bonds and the affect of group members may converge over time. When group members and therapists develop shared therapeutic goals and engage in mutually beneficial behaviors, they will develop more positive relationships and accompanying positive affect (Bordin, 1979). Moreover, when members of therapy groups develop more affective ties over time, congruence in their affective experience will emerge (Coyne et al., 2018). Consequently, a potential indicator of an effective therapeutic alliance would be high levels of shared affect that results from the processes associated with affect convergence.

Although our focus here has been on affect convergence, it is important to recognize affect divergence occurs at least occasionally (Barsade & Knight, 2015; Tiedens et al., 2004). Affect divergence is likely in conditions in which group members have different roles in the group (Tiedens et al., 2004), or when group members

This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.

This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.

are asked to take unique perspectives (e.g., devil's advocate; Janis, 1982). Moreover, affective processes in groups can involve complementary emotional reactions in which an emotion in a group member elicits alternative emotions in other group members (Van Kleef, 2016). In these cases, emotion does not transfer a congruent affect but rather arouses complementary affect. For example, observing a sad group member prompts compassion in other group members (Lilius et al., 2008) or a leader's anger sparks subordinates' fear (Liu et al., 2021). Moreover, the degree of convergence and divergence of affect in groups differs depending on arousal and valence of the affect. Highly activated affect is more likely to be exchanged, converge, and become contagious in groups compared to low activated affect (Bartel & Saavedra, 2000) because high activated affect attracts attention and is easier to convey than low activated affect (Barsade, 2002).

The processes that lead to affect convergence among group members reflect both affect sharing and shared affect. Convergence is important in formulations of socially shared affect because affect is implicitly assumed to be an individual-level phenomenon (Menges & Kilduff, 2015). And as individuals, the affect of group members would often be divergent in groups (Emich, 2020). Individual group members often experience different appraisals and thus different affective states (Elfenbein, 2014). Affect convergence demonstrates that shared affect and affect sharing are cross-level properties in groups that are important influences on group dynamics and group outcomes (Kozlowski & Klein, 2000).

The Experience of Socially Shared Affect: Shared Events, States, and Appraisals


When affect is shared and is being shared in groups, this sharedness can occur for various aspects or dimensions of a shared affective experience. As with affective experiences in general, the sharedness of affective experiences can be arrayed along dimensions. We describe the sharedness of affective experiences along the dimensions of (a) the sharedness of the affective event(s) or stimuli that generates the affective experience, (b) the sharedness of the affective state that results from the event(s), and (c) the sharedness of the appraisal of the affective experience. We present this three-dimensional framework for the sharedness of affective experiences in Figure 1. With this framework, it is possible to see that sharedness can be described solely along one of the dimensions, but could be described as involving a pair of the dimensions, and could more comprehensively be described along all three of these dimensions. It is this more comprehensive description that provides a basis for considering how socially shared affect is experienced. Interestingly, Figure 1 indicates that there is only one location in which the affect is completely unshared, however, all other locations in the three-dimensional space indicate that the affect is at least partially shared. Moreover, the three-dimensional space in the framework depicted in Figure 1 conceptually separates the dimensions of affective sharedness, but this does not mean that the affective experience falls along these dimensions. Rather, this framework demonstrates that affective experiences are generally shared to some degree along each of the dimensions. We will take up these three dimensions in sequence to help describe how the framework allows us to appreciate the complexity of socially shared affect.

Shared Affective Events

The framework for the sharedness of affective experiences depicted in Figure 1 allows us to consider how events, conditions, contexts, circumstances, and situations might be associated with a shared affective experience. An affective event is something that anticipates an affective state, and as such, it is part of the affective experience. When people consider emotions, the event is believed to cause the emotion. Alternatively, with regard to moods for which people may be unaware of the cause, the mood arises from a situation (e.g., background, context, condition). We will use affective events to refer to the stimuli (i.e., events and situations) associated with the generation of affect.

Affective events imply that there has been a stimulus change that anticipated a change in affective states, and the event may have precipitated the affective state (Weiss & Cropanzano, 1996). The person may be conscious or unaware of the event and the change in the affective state. Our current interest is in how shared these affective events are among group

Figure 1
Three-Dimensional Framework for the Sharedness of Affective Experiences



members. But not all shared events are shared affective events. Many mundane events occur among group members which do not anticipate or precipitate a change in their affective state. Yet, group members often do share positive and negative affective events (Ohly & Schmitt, 2015). Assuming that there are ways of specifying and assessing the events that anticipate a change in affective states, then it should be possible to scrutinize the degree that the affective event is shared among group members.

For group members, it is shared events associated with changes in shared feelings that are shared affective events. In research, affect manipulations are affective events that produce changes in participants' affect. Henkel and Hinsz (2004) changed affective ratings by allowing participants to succeed or fail in achieving a task performance goal. For shared affective events, affect manipulations have to be shared. Background music that is positive, neutral, or negative is often used to manipulate affective states, and group members can share exposure to these stimuli (e.g., Park & Hinsz, 2015). Research has used environmental conditions (e.g., weather; Schwarz & Clore, 1983) as affective events; however, this research finds that stimuli associated with changes in affective states outside of awareness produce different affect if the person attributes their affect to previously unaware stimuli. Consequently, research and conceptualization needs to be concerned with the degree the shared affective state reflects the critical aspects of the affective event. Shared affective events are key instigators of affective contagion, and the sharedness of the affective state largely determines the shared appraisal of the affect (Elfenbein, 2014).

Shared affective events reflect the degree to which group members sense or are exposed to the same affective stimuli (Boothby et al., 2014). The affective events can arise for any of the senses or in combinations of the senses. These shared events can involve physical interaction (e.g., playing football; Hopfensitz & Mantilla, 2019), with or without verbal or nonverbal communication (e.g., taste testing chocolate; Boothby et al., 2014). Shared affective events can happen synchronously (e.g., a couple welcomes a newborn; Boothby et al., 2016) or asynchronously (e.g., group members learn about third-party abusive behaviors on different days; Marr et al., 2012). Group members may sense affective events

This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.

in different ways but the stimuli should provide important information such that similar appraisals emerge and result in shared affective experiences.

To the degree that group members jointly and contemporaneously experience affective events, group members are likely to have shared feelings about the events. For example, Cheong et al. (2020) found that paired dyads who jointly watched a movie were more likely to simultaneously display similar facial expressions relative to unpaired dyads who did not physically watch the movie together or individuals who watched the movie alone. Chang et al. (2021) found that participants watching a movie together experienced similar feelings and patterns of changes in their feelings. These findings suggest that the same affective events provide the same informational basis for group members' interpretation of the event. Given the same stimuli, group members would be more likely to contemporaneously have similar affective states during shared events.

Shared affective events can enhance the intensity of the accompanying affect. Shteynberg et al. (2014) presented single individuals and group members positive and negative stimuli and found that group members rated the stimuli more extreme in affect than did individuals. Boothby et al. (2014) argued that when people experience a stimulus, they notice the stimulus and simultaneously think about other coactors (e.g., how others may sense and think about the stimuli). Using a chocolate taste test task, Boothby et al. (2014) found participants rated pleasant (unpleasant) chocolate more flavorful (unappetizing) when tasting with a coactor than when the coactor viewed a booklet of paintings. These findings indicate that contemporaneous sharing of affective events with awareness of coactors intensifies affect elicited by the events.

Shared affective events are shared among group members to the degree the members sense or are exposed to the same affect arousing stimuli (Elfenbein, 2014). The stimuli should not differ among group members, nor should the sensory experience be degraded for some group members (e.g., not seeing or hearing the stimuli as well). Importantly, different group members should receive the same exposure and give the same attention to the stimuli. All of these conditions make it challenging to specify and assess the sharedness of the various aspects of the complex affective events that are part of group interaction. Yet, if group members sense and are exposed to the same affective event, they may experience a similar, shared affective state.

Shared Affective State

Affective events anticipate and are associated with the affective state that is experienced. Affective states are experiential in nature, reflecting noncognitive feelings about stimuli (Frijda, 1993). In groups, members can experience shared affective states. To be shared means that the affective states are communicated in some fashion. In many research settings, the experienced affective state is communicated as a self-report of the affective state, although other forms of communication can serve as the affective state such as facial expressions, body posture, etc. (e.g., Barsade, 2002; Bartel & Saavedra, 2000). Regardless, if the affective state can be assessed, and assessed reliably, then the degree of the affective state is shared among group members can be determined. Often the affective state experienced is assessed by self-report measures of affective states with response scales (e.g., PANAS; Watson et al., 1988), and the degree of sharedness can be calculated as an index (e.g., ICC; Park & Hinsz, 2015; r_{wg}; Bartel & Saavedra, 2000). However, the self-report measure should validly reflect the underlying experience of affective states to provide a basis for the assessment, which will depend upon an understanding of the underlying structure of affective states.

Barrett and Russell (1999) articulate a two-dimensional structure for experienced affective states. These two independent dimensions are meant to describe core affective states, which may not represent nuanced aspects of affect, such as unique emotional episodes. The two-dimensional structure suggests that affect involves one dimension of pleasure–displeasure which is sometimes called the valence of affective states. The valence dimension reflects what is considered the hedonic tone of affect such as if the affective state is positive or negative. When shared affective states are described, they often focus on this positive–negative affect dimension (e.g., that group interaction sustains positive affect and diminishes negative affect; Park & Hinsz, 2015).

The second dimension of the structure for affect reflects the activation of the affective state such as the level of excitement or fatigue. This

This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.

activation dimension concerns the arousal component of the affective state (Reisenzein, 1994) and is sometimes considered the intensity of the affect. This activation dimension can be represented as activated (energetic, engaged, excited, agitated) versus deactivated (calm, sleepy, relaxed, lethargic). Whereas the valence of the affect provides feedback to group members about whether the affective event experienced was positive or negative, the activation of the affective state provides feedback to group members about motivation as a function of the event. As such, the activation component relates more to the action resulting from the affect while the valence is associated with evaluative reactions. To the degree group members share the valence and the activation reactions to experiencing an affective event, then the group members are also likely to evaluate the event in the same way as well as be implicitly motivated toward a shared response to the affective event.

The valence and activation dimensional structure of experienced affective states has important implications for shared affective states. The valence dimension highlights the shared positive and negative feelings among group members (e.g., affective tone, cohesiveness) as well as a common evaluation of the stimuli and events to which they are exposed. Interestingly, the valence dimension reflects the semantic space of the shared affective events for those group members in terms of evaluation (Osgood et al., 1957). The activation dimension also reflects this semantic space such that an experienced shared affective state would stimulate group members toward activity (Osgood et al., 1957). Importantly, we can expect that the activation/arousal component of affect to be exaggerated when it is shared. The drive theory of social facilitation (Zajonc, 1965, 1980) implies that the mere presence of other group members will enhance the arousal among all group members. Moreover, excitation transfer theory (Zillmann, 1979) indicates that interactions among group members can enhance the activation level among all group members. Thus, there are theoretical reasons to expect that socially sharing affect will increase the activation/arousal of the experienced affective state among group members.

Shared affective experiences should also result in accentuation of the valence of the affective state among group members. Much like group polarization of affective ratings, accentuation can occur when reported valence of the affect becomes more intense or extreme in groups (Barsade & Gibson, 1998; Hinsz & Robinson, 2023). For instance, if group members share an experience of injustice and share the accompanying anger, the shared anger will become more pronounced among group members. If group members self-report their anger, they will tend to exaggerate their affective ratings by reporting the points closest to the endpoints and away from the midpoint of the scale. In addition to this accentuation of shared affective states, group involvement and interaction produces sharing of affect, and as a consequence, the experienced affective state should be more shared (i.e., affective contagion). Both the accentuation and convergence patterns should occur for shared affective states in groups such that rated affect should move toward extremes while becoming more shared (homogeneous).

The experience of shared affective states among group members can produce unique patterns for both the valence and activation dimensions of affect. Group members' evaluation of the valence of their shared affective states should become more extreme as a function of sharing affective experiences. Moreover, group members should feel more affective arousal and activation to the degree they share that affective state among themselves. Although this section focused on shared affective states, it is challenging to separate affective states from the events and the appraisal associated with shared affective experiences. Because we are interested in the shared experience of affective states, we assumed that evaluations of affective states by group members reflect unbiased and valid representations of the affective state. This assumption requires critical attention, but it does lead us to consider how shared affective experiences are appraised by group members.

Shared Affective Appraisals

Appraisal theories of affect (Frijda, 1986; Lazarus, 1991; Scherer et al., 2001) highlight the important role that appraisal plays in affective experience. Whereas shared affective states are noncognitive reactions to events or stimuli that bring about change in affective states, shared affective appraisals reflect the awareness, interpretation and representation of those affective events. The appraisal of affect involves complex

This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.

processes, and for shared affective appraisals, these processes would be shared as well. These socially shared affective processes of appraisal occur at the confluence of affect and cognition. We will focus on three phases of shared affective appraisal: awareness, sensemaking, and representation, although these are not independent phases. Again, it is challenging to separate the appraisal from the event or the affective state. Consequently, aspects of shared affective events and shared affective states will arise as we consider how shared appraisals are involved in shared affective experiences.

Researchers who discuss appraisal processes at the individual level divide it into a number of components (Scherer, 2009). Some of these components relate to aspects of affect already discussed: (a) the event or sensory (stimuli) basis for the change in feeling; (b) the value associated with the affect, that is, the evaluation of the affect; (c) how the affect relates to the appraiser's experiences, that is, an affect schema; (d) the way the affective experience is represented; which is related to the schema but also anticipates (e) how the affect implicates a readiness for action. These components indicate that appraisal involves an interaction between the affective event and the appraiser's hedonic feelings. Given the key role of the appraiser in the appraisal process, individual differences can emerge in appraisals among group members which can map onto differences in the robustness of the affective experience. Although these individual difference variables regarding affective experience are not examined in this review of socially shared affect, note that explorations of the impact of dispositional affective states of group members will provide a richer understanding of how diverse affective processes and affective diversity among group members will impact the dynamics of socially shared affect in groups.

Working in groups may lead to reappraisal processes which can include members inspecting other members' affect to appraise their own feelings (Cohen, 2004; Cohen & Wills, 1985). Appraisal theories suggest that appraisals are malleable and can change over time as new information is gathered and different dimensions of the affective stimuli are considered (Scherer et al., 2001). The reappraisal processes can involve changes from initial affective appraisals such that group members become more similar in their affective appraisals (Menges & Kilduff, 2015). For example, interactions among group members could help clarify events regarding a group member's performance (e.g., "You should not feel bad. You didn't see the other group members' sabotaging your efforts."). In therapy groups, therapists can guide patients to engage in reflection and reappraisal of affective experiences, which can result in learning and changes in patients' affective experiences (Yalom & Leszcz, 2020). Affective appraisal processes can help interpret the significance of affective events for group members such that they can appreciate the potential impact of affective events for their well-being (cf. Moors et al., 2013). Affective appraisal and reappraisal processes gain more understanding with a consideration of awareness, sensemaking, and representation of shared affect, which are considered next.

Shared Awareness of Affect

The first phase of affective appraisal is an awareness of the affective event or stimuli, which involves attending to the event and a detection of sensory information (Elfenbein, 2007). Much like shared situation awareness (Endsley, 1995; Salas et al., 1995), shared affective experiences involve a shared awareness of the event or stimuli associated with a change in feelings. Because affective appraisal is deeply contextualized, this awareness would involve the shared recognition and detection of the affective event. From a shared awareness of affect, group members can better appraise their own and other group members' affective experiences. The shared awareness allows group members to direct and focus attention on those affective features that are deemed relevant for the appraisal of the shared affective experience. Consequently, shared awareness contributes to the interpretation of events or stimuli that are relevant to the appraisal of the shared affective experience.

Shared awareness of affective events in a group requires effective communication among group members about what happened and perhaps why it happened (Salas et al., 1995). When group members share information about the stimuli, the awareness of other group members regarding the affective event can be modified. Moreover, this sharing may impact other group members' recognition of the relevance of the event for change in affective states (Weiss & Cropanzano, 1996). Moreover, depending on group members'

This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.

awareness of specific affective stimuli, group members may experience shared or unique affect (Scherer et al., 2001). To the degree that group members share similar awareness about the elements of the affective experience, then their appraisals of the affective experience will be more highly shared. Moreover, the shared awareness of the affective events can enhance how shared the affect is, as well as accentuate the shared awareness of the affective experience, which will also assist group members in making sense of their affective experience.

Shared Sensemaking of Affect

Shared sensemaking is processes through which group members arrive at a common interpretation of events (Maitlis, 2005; Weick et al., 2005). Shared sensemaking augments shared awareness of affective experiences to impact shared affective appraisals. Through aspects of socially shared cognition (e.g., information exchange) and what might be considered affect discourse processes (e.g., affect narratives), group members can make sense of affective experiences with similar interpretations that may converge over time. These shared sensemaking processes can facilitate a shared affective appraisal among group members.

When group members share their perspectives about the stimuli or their interpretation of the stimuli, they provide a basis for making shared sense of the stimuli (Wrzesniewski et al., 2003). Group members interact to convey notions and revise narratives about affective stimuli (Weick et al., 2005) so that they can produce a shared affective appraisal. In contrast, when group members interpret the same affective stimuli differently, they are likely to experience different affect (Scherer et al., 2001). For example, a project's failure may create anger in members who attribute the failure to external reasons (e.g., lack of support from the top management team), guilt in members who make an internal attribution (e.g., not putting forth sufficient effort), and sadness in members who attribute the failure to uncontrollable reasons (e.g., pandemic). Thus, consistent with the appraisal theory of emotion (Scherer et al., 2001), the same event may prompt different affective experiences because group members appraise the stimuli in different ways.

Shared Representations of Affect

Shared affective appraisals are enhanced when group members share representations of the affect that propels the appraisals. A shared representation reflects any concept, norm, perspective, or interpretation that is shared by group members (Tindale et al., 1996). Aligned with other concepts of socially shared cognition (Hinsz, 1995a, 2004; Tindale & Kameda, 2000), a shared representation conveys that group members have a shared perspective of the world which guides how group members will act and interact. Related to the shared sensemaking processes for affect, shared representations of affect reflect how group members interpret affective stimuli, guide group members' affective responses, and help determine the degree of shared affect at the group level. In many ways, a shared representation of affective experiences is the group members' shared affective model upon which shared affective appraisals are based.

Shared representations of affect are at the heart of what determines the kinds of affect that will be activated and shared at the group level (Sawyer & Clair, 2022). The shared representation of affect, much like a shared schema, reflects (a) the affective content of the affective experience, (b) the relationships among this content and other experiences that contribute to the affective appraisal, and (c) the degree this affective content and sets of relationships are shared among group members. This conceptualization of shared representations of affect can be illustrated with an example of compassion among team members. Compassion could arise when one team member witnesses another team member's needs and becomes motivated to help the teammate (Goetz et al., 2010). The representation characterizes and structures the appraisal of experienced compassion for the other team member given their particular needs. If the team members share this compassionate state, they may also share an appraisal of their compassion. If team members share an interpretation that they have capacity to provide help, there is a high likelihood that team members will experience compassion. However, if team members share an interpretation that the member needing help was undependable and lazy, team members would be less likely to experience compassion. Importantly, the degree to which the affect (e.g., compassion) is shared varies depending on the

This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.

degree to which team members share their representations of the affective experience (e.g., compassion). This example with compassion illustrates the roles that shared representations of affect play in the appraisal processes associated with socially shared affect. These shared affective appraisals, along with shared affective states and events can then anticipate other group-level outcomes and mechanisms associated with socially shared affect.

Some Group Topics Related to Socially Shared Affect

There are numerous concepts that come to mind beyond those already discussed when socially shared affect is considered. An elaborate and comprehensive nomological network of relationships could be developed and discussed such as that of Barsade and Knight (2015) for group affect. Yet, as an extensive introduction of conceptualizing socially shared affect, such a nomological network is beyond the scope of this article. Nevertheless, there are antecedents, consequences, and related concepts of socially shared affect deserving of at least brief discussion. When considering these concepts, we are struck by how often they map onto Cartwright's (1968) conceptualization of group cohesiveness. We describe some of these concepts below and recommend readers desiring a more comprehensive list of factors related to socially shared affect to examine Cartwright (1968) and Barsade and Knight (2015).

Group Cohesiveness

A classic construct associated with socially shared affect is group cohesiveness. Group cohesiveness was defined as "the resultant of all the forces acting on members to remain in the group" (Festinger, 1950, p. 274), "the degree to which the members of a group desire to remain in the group" (Cartwright, 1968, p. 91). Group cohesiveness is also defined as group attraction, group members' desire to identify with and be accepted as part of a group (Evans & Jarvis, 1980) as well as a group's degree of unity, with members sharing an affective bond (Forsyth, 2021). Central to these definitions is an affective reaction to membership in a group that is to a degree shared among group members. Similar to the conceptions of affective states, group cohesiveness reflects both an affective state as well as group members' inclination toward action. And because these aspects of affect arise within groups, group cohesiveness is a socially shared affect.

There is a reciprocal relationship between socially shared affect and group cohesiveness, whereby group cohesiveness promotes shared affect which in turn enhances group cohesiveness (Barsade & Gibson, 1998; Forsyth, 2021). The group cohesiveness literature illustrates that shared positive affect enhances group cohesiveness and that group cohesiveness enhances shared positive affect among members (Forsyth, 2021). In group psychotherapy, shared and sharing affect, regardless of its valence, promotes group cohesiveness, which is a critical determinant of treatment effectiveness (Burlingame et al., 2001; Marmarosh et al., 2005). Cohesive groups create social bonds with high interpersonal attraction and positive attitudes among group members (Lott & Lott, 1965). These affective social bonds can result in group members' wanting to share their feelings and thoughts (Stokes, 1983). Group members with highly shared affect are similar in their appraisal and feelings, and are likely to bond and be motivated to stay members of the group. Moreover, the bonding processes associated with group cohesiveness result in pressures among group members toward uniformity of feelings and conformity to group norms (Baumeister & Leary, 1995). Therefore, group members are likely to converge in their affective feelings while sharing their affective reactions (Barsade & Gibson, 1998).

Although group cohesiveness is associated with group interactions involving positive affect, there is also evidence that shared and sharing affect have influences on group disintegration. As family members in therapy experience intense negative affect, they may attack each other while also motivating support. Family members may resolve their negative feelings toward each other, then arrive at mutual understanding, acceptance, and respect (Yalom & Leszcz, 2020). However, shared negative affect can also be detrimental to therapy groups, requiring therapists' to use affect management skills. Because shared negative affect often stems from internal sources within groups, shared negative affect may lead to negative consequences such as conflict, hostility, and withdrawal (Bernard et al., 2008).

This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.

This is consistent with the literature that shared negative affect elicited from internal sources leads to group disintegration and ultimately decreased group performance (Knight & Eisenkraft, 2015). The detrimental effects of shared negative affect can be constrained by shifting the focus from the contents of critical events to group members' examination of the group's shared affective state and how group members appraised the experience (Burlingame et al., 2021). On occasion, therapists may intentionally initiate shared negative affect in groups to enact group members' maladaptive behaviors and use the resulting group experiences to guide learning and change (Yalom & Leszcz, 2020). Consequently, the sharing of negative and positive affect appears to play different roles in the development and maintenance of group cohesiveness and disintegration.

Social Categorization and Identification

Social identity theory and self-categorization theory suggest that individuals categorize themselves as belonging to certain groups, with this identification guiding their behavior (Tajfel, 1974; Turner, 1985). Group members generally find themselves similar to others within their groups, particularly for the group's prototypical features (Hogg & Abrams, 1988). A group-based affect perspective of categorization and identification suggests that when group identification is salient, appraisals of affective events and stimuli that impact a member's group will arouse shared affect about the group (Goldenberg et al., 2020; Smith et al., 2007). Moreover, group identification should facilitate affect sharing resulting in greater shared affect through group members' openness to receive other group members' affective influence. This openness signals willingness to be accepted in groups, perceived as similar, and bond with other group members. Group members with high group identification should be willing to attend to, catch, and assimilate other group members' affective signals, resulting in greater affect sharing and shared affect in groups (Tanghe et al., 2010).

Membership Stability

The stability of membership in groups is critical to develop and sustain sharedness in groups (Li & van Knippenberg, 2021; Mathieu et al., 2014). Changes in group membership can disrupt patterns of group interaction (e.g., coordination) and socioemotional bonds among group members (e.g., Arrow & Crosson, 2003; van der Vegt et al., 2010) which will inhibit the social sharing of affect. Bartel and Saavedra (2000) argue that membership stability enables frequent and continued interactions, which provide group members opportunities to express and detect each other's affect. Familiarity among group members would also tend to enhance accurate appraisals of affective expressions within groups. Therefore, membership stability can facilitate affective convergence in groups (Bartel & Saavedra, 2000).

Group Norms

Groups have and enforce social norms about the appropriateness of expressing and experiencing affect in groups (Eid & Diener, 2001; Ekman, 1973). Norms, as socially shared expectations, manage affect sharing and shared affect in groups. Some groups may have norms that encourage the expression of specific affective states (e.g., anger, gratitude; Delvaux et al., 2015; compassion, Lilius et al., 2011). Other groups may have norms that restrict the expression of affect (e.g., Chiang et al., 2021; Menges et al., 2015). New members entering groups often draw upon norms to determine appropriate affective expressions (Ashforth & Humphrey, 2022). These norms can govern group members' affect so that members experience and display affect that aligns with group norms (Kelly & Barsade, 2001). Affect regulation via group norms predicts the convergence of pleasant and unpleasant affective states (Bartel & Saavedra, 2000). Group norms of anger and gratitude were found to enhance group members' experiences of anger and gratitude, resulting in the convergence of anger and gratitude in groups (Delvaux et al., 2015). Therefore, similar to other group norms, norms of affect in groups serve to guide and regulate the expectations and actions of group members, resulting in the sharing of affect and consequently the degree of shared affect in groups.

Leadership

Leaders hold the highest position in a group's status hierarchy, having powerful influences on

This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.

This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.

the affect of group members (e.g., contagion, convergence; Fredrickson, 2003; Pescosolido, 2002; Redl, 1942). Leaders can activate, model, and regulate affect for group members to coordinate group interactions toward achieving shared goals and to inform group members of appropriate responses to situations (Pescosolido, 2002; Pirola-Merlo et al., 2002). Group members tend to be aware of, and conform to, leaders' affective expectations to respond appropriately and facilitate social integration (Bono & Ilies, 2006; Johnson, 2008; Sy & Choi, 2013). For example, group members tend to assimilate leaders' affect as well as converge around that affective state, particularly positive affect (Sy & Choi, 2013; Sy et al., 2005, 2013). Thus, leadership can be expected to have influences on the affect of group members similar to the influences of leadership on member cognitions and actions. Research will need to continue to explore how leadership can involve the processes associated with the social sharing of affect.

Group Size

Group size can change the degree of affect sharing and homogeneity of affect in groups. When group size increases, group structures and member relationships change. The connections among group members become less stable because more relationships are needed to link all members to each other (Forsyth, 2018). Groups also face challenges in coordinating group members' effort toward collective goals (Steiner, 1972). There will be less participation and weakened solidarity among group members. These consequences of increases in group size will undermine group structures and processes associated with affect sharing and affect convergence, such as bonding among members and developing group affective norms (Kelly, 2001).

Group size can also change the intensity of group members' affect (Kelly, 2001). For example, based upon motivational systems theory of group involvement (Hinsz et al., 2019; Park & Hinsz, 2006), Hinsz (2020) tested hypotheses regarding group size influences on positive and negative affect. Due to the group members holding core beliefs of strength and safety in numbers, positive affect would increase monotonically as group size increased and negative affect would decrease monotonically as group size increased. Motivational systems theory of group involvement also proposes that because group members share a belief of safety in numbers, they should feel less fear and reactions to threat cues when they are in larger groups (Tedeschi et al., 2021). Research on the bystander effect indicated that larger groups reduced individuals' sympathy to intervene in emergency situations (e.g., Latané & Darley, 1969; Levine & Crowther, 2008). This pattern of effects for group size requires more investigation to determine which mechanisms and contextual factors alter how group size impacts shared affective states in groups. Moreover, given the differential effects of group interaction on positive and negative affect (Park & Hinsz, 2015), there should be further examination of how different patterns may emerge for positive and negative affective states (valence) for group size as well as for accentuation of affect shared in groups.

Task Interdependence

Task interdependence is the degree to which group members' actions rely on other group members' actions or inactions (Hinsz, 1995b). Task independence is a key source of interconnection among group members which provides a basis for influencing affect sharing and the convergence of affect. When tasks are highly interdependent, group members must increase collaboration and coordination to establish unified work strategies (Wageman, 1995). Bartel and Saavedra (2000) argued that high task independence forces group members to share affect to better coordinate with each other. High task independence also provides group members opportunities to promote positive interactions, perceive other members' affect, and conduct affect comparisons, thus facilitating affect sharing and affect convergence. Indeed, Bartel and Saavedra (2000) found that greater task interdependence enhanced affect convergence in groups.

Group Effectiveness

Socially shared affect can directly and indirectly influence group effectiveness. The degree of shared affect can impact group members' perceived similarity in groups, which in turn relates to numerous benefits, ranging from interpersonal satisfaction (Sacco et al., 2014), commitment to build stable and long-term

relationships (Baumeister & Leary, 1995), and group identification (Leach et al., 2008). Jeong and Korsgaard (2022) found that dissimilarity in perceived positive affect among team members reduced team members' commitment. When groups have high levels of shared positive affect, they are likely to engage in positive behavioral processes such as social integration, coordination, helping, and eventually promote group adaptability, viability, and performance. For example, homogeneity of team positive affect positively relates to team effectiveness indicators of team situation awareness, cognitive resource management, information exchange, and crew collaboration (Kaplan et al., 2013). Jeong and Korsgaard (2022) demonstrated that the relationships between team performance and the team's mean level of positive affect were stronger when positive affect was shared in the teams. This finding illustrates that socially shared affect can have both direct (mediator) and indirect (moderator) influences on measures of group effectiveness, and that complex relationships might be expected as socially shared affect is considered for other group outcomes.

Discussion

This article provides a review of socially shared affect with a focus on shared affect and affect sharing in groups. Underlying this is an emphasis on social sharedness as a theme of affective processing in groups which directed attention to affective convergence (shared affect) and affective and emotion contagion (affect sharing). A framework was offered for organizing how sharedness of affective experiences in group settings can be conceived, arraying aspects of shared affective experience along three dimensions (Figure 1): affective events, affective states, and affective appraisal (awareness, sensemaking, representation). This examination reveals important ways in which shared affective experiences differ from those of lone individuals. The review also highlighted numerous topics from group research relevant to socially shared affect. It is particularly enlightening to consider group cohesiveness as a socially shared affect and social norms as being applicable for the regulation of affect in group settings. Many other insights, implications, and challenges derive from an examination of socially shared affect in groups.

Many of the notions associated with socially shared affect in groups reflect distributional characteristics of the affective responses of group members. Assuming that group members indicate aspects of their affective experience on a judgment (e.g., appraisal), rating (e.g., affective state), or descriptive (e.g., stimuli or event) response scale, then a variety of statistical procedures can be applied to those group member affective responses. Moreover, summary statistics of the distribution of group members' responses can be calculated, and aggregated at the level of a group or across a sample of groups. Each of these statistics can inform us about the reported nature of affect from among those group members. The variance of the group member responses relates to the homogeneity and heterogeneity of reported affect, and if measured over the duration of group interaction, it will index affective convergence or divergence. The central tendency of the distribution of affective responses provides a notion of where the group or set of groups is generally located on the response scale. If the distribution of group affective responses is skewed, then group involvement results in an exaggeration of the underlying group affective responses (Hinsz & Robinson, 2023; Tiedens et al., 2004). If the distribution is examined at the level of the group, then movement toward the affective response of one of the group members would be indicative of contagion. Moreover, if the interrelationships in the affective responses of members of a group are assessed to determine the interdependence among member responses (e.g., ICC; Shrout & Fleiss, 1979), then an index can be calculated for the degree that group members share an affective response. Thus, much can be learned from careful inspection of the distributional qualities of the group members' responses regarding aspects of their affective experiences.

The discussion of affective appraisals highlighted the interaction of affect and cognition in affective experiences (Moors et al., 2013). Given the coordination needs and reduced tempo of affective appraisal processes in groups, there may be greater interaction of affect and cognition in socially shared affective appraisals. Consequently, both moods and emotions could provide more feedback to group members about the nature of their affective experiences (Hinsz & Robinson, 2023). To aid our consideration of appraisal processes for socially shared affect, we

This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.

This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.

have drawn upon notions from socially shared cognition such as shared representations (Tindale et al., 1996). We might also consider group members having beliefs and feelings about how affect operates and functions in groups (e.g., mental models of affect in groups; Hinsz, 1995a) or a meta-affect for groups (cf. Hinsz, 2004). It might be beneficial to consider other concepts from socially shared cognition for their potential applicability to socially shared affect.

The literature on information processing in groups (Hinsz et al., 1997) offers substantial evidence that group members are likely to share or discuss information that is already known by those group members. That is, there is a bias to share and discuss information that is already known by group members (i.e., shared information bias, information sharing bias) which is detrimental to discussing the unique or unshared information that may be critical to reaching the most effective group response (Gigone & Hastie, 1993; Stasser & Titus, 1987). We assert, subject to empirical validation, that there are *shared affect and affect sharing biases* that occur for affective experiences in interacting groups. That is, for group members interacting or involved in groups, group members will increasingly share affect that is already shared (common) among the group members. Moreover, group involvement and group interaction reinforce the sharing of affect that is being shared (exchanged) among group members. Likewise, group involvement and group interaction will diminish the degree of shared affect for uniquely held affect as well as be less likely to share (transfer, communicate) affect that group members tended not to be sharing (exchange). The earlier discussion in this review about shared affect and affect sharing provides a basis for this assertion (see also Hinsz & Robinson, 2023). There are important implications of the shared affect and affect sharing biases such as the mutual enhancement and mutual support in the sharing of feelings that are felt among group members involved and interacting in groups (Wittenbaum & Park, 2001).

This review discusses affective experiences focusing on single affective states; however, this belies the complexity of socially shared affect of group members and groups. Group members can simultaneously experience positive and negative affect (J. T. Larsen et al., 2001), as well as multiple and mixed feelings. Research has examined complex combinations of affective experiences felt simultaneously such as ambivalent affect and nostalgia which is a bittersweet affective experience (Ashforth et al., 2014; Leunissen, 2023). If these complex combinations of affect arise in group members, then socially shared affect in groups will involve constellations of affective experiences. Research can explore which configurations of complex combinations of member affective experiences will be effective or ineffective in different group settings (Emich & Lu, 2021). Such questions will be relevant for affectively intense group settings such as psychodrama and professional wrestling tag-team events. As more comprehensive conceptualizations of socially shared affect develop, it will be important to consider issues such as the antecedents, consequences, and boundary conditions of these constellations of group member affective experience. Such conceptualizations could draw upon frameworks examining the development and change in affective convergence and diversity in interacting groups because the constellations involve variations in affective experiences within and between group members.

This review focused on processes and concepts related to socially shared affect and used examples and illustrations of different types of groups and teams, in particular teams in organizations and groups involved in psychotherapy. Nevertheless, the concepts, insights and implications derived from the examination in this review are not limited to specific types of groups. Rather, considerations of groups as affective processing social entities should be applicable to all kinds of group settings and types of groups (e.g., group typologies; McGrath, 1984). This would include sports teams, social groups, families, groups in extreme environments, and even research teams. This review rests upon an analysis of affect in generic group settings; however, future investigation should enhance the understanding of boundary conditions as well as how group type moderates the phenomena associated with socially shared affect.

Although the examination of socially shared affect in this review provides a variety of insights, implications, and conceptualizations, there are still a number of questions that remain. We conclude with just a few of these questions. At a very broad level, and borrowing from Leavitt (1974), "What if we took the notions of affective processing in groups seriously?" This would require a transition from an examination founded

upon conceptions of affect at the individual level (e.g., Frijda, 1993) to consider affective experiences at the group level. This review article focused on shared affective experiences; however, this was still from the perspective of sharing the affect of individual group members. What understanding might be gained and distinctive concepts emerge if we considered moods, emotions, and affect at a group level of analysis (cf. Bui et al., 2023; Wang et al., 2023)? Likewise, many additional insights might stem from considering groups as affective processing social entities.

Similarly, what might be learned if other ways of conceptualizing affect were applied to socially shared affect in groups? This review barely considered dispositional affect (e.g., positive and negative affectivity; Watson, 2000) for the ways members' stable affective states might modify how affect is socially shared in groups. Nor did this review consider regulatory systems approaches to affect (e.g., Gross, 2001; R. J. Larsen, 2000). Social norms were described as serving to guide, manage and regulate affect. How would affective norms and other regulatory mechanisms (e.g., feedback) impact the ways that affect is socially shared? Moreover, if we consider affective regulation to manage members' affective experiences, how might regulatory systems or other approaches provide theoretical bases for understanding and predicting the dynamics of affect change in groups? Addressing questions such as these can inspire further examination and investigation of affective experiences in groups.

References

Ancona, D., & Chong, C. L. (1996). Entrainment: Pace, cycle and rhythm in organizational behavior. *Research in Organizational Behavior*, *18*, 251–284.

Anderson, C., Keltner, D., & John, O. P. (2003). Emotional convergence between people over time. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *84*(5), 1054–1068. https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.84.5.1054

Arrow, H., & Crosson, S. (2003). Musical chairs membership dynamics in self-organized group formation. *Small Group Research*, *34*(5), 523–556. https://doi.org/10.1177/1046496403254585

Arrow, H., McGrath, J. E., & Berdahl, J. L. (2000). *Small groups as complex systems: Formation, coordination, development, and adaptation*. Sage Publications. https://doi.org/10.4135/9781452204666

Ashforth, B. E., & Humphrey, R. H. (2022). Institutionalized affect in organizations: Not an oxymoron. *Human Relations*, *75*(8), 1483–1517. https://doi.org/10.1177/00187267221083093

Ashforth, B. E., Rogers, K. M., Pratt, M. G., & Pradies, C. (2014). Ambivalence in organizations: A multilevel approach. *Organization Science*, *25*(5), 1453–1478. https://doi.org/10.1287/orsc.2014.0909

Atzil-Slonim, D., Bar-Kalifa, E., Rafaeli, E., Lutz, W., Rubel, J., Schiefele, A. K., & Peri, T. (2015). Therapeutic bond judgments: Congruence and incongruence. *Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology*, *83*(4), 773–784. https://doi.org/10.1037/ccp0000015

Barrett, L. F., & Russell, J. A. (1999). The structure of current affect: Controversies and emerging consensus. *Current Directions in Psychological Science*, *8*(1), 10–14. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-8721.00003

Barsade, S. G. (2002). The ripple effect: Emotional contagion and its influence on group behavior. *Administrative Science Quarterly*, *47*(4), 644–675. https://doi.org/10.2307/3094912

Barsade, S. G., & Gibson, D. E. (1998). Group emotion: A view from top and bottom. In D. Gruenfeld, E. A. Mannix, & M. A. Neale (Eds.), *Research on managing groups and teams* (Vol. 1, pp. 81–102). JAI Press.

Barsade, S. G., & Knight, A. P. (2015). Group affect. *Annual Review of Organizational Psychology and Organizational Behavior*, *2*(1), 21–46. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-orgpsych-032414-111316

Bartel, C. A., & Saavedra, R. (2000). The collective construction of work group moods. *Administrative Science Quarterly*, *45*(2), 197–231. https://doi.org/10.2307/2667070

Baumeister, R. F., & Leary, M. R. (1995). The need to belong: Desire for interpersonal attachments as a fundamental human motivation. *Psychological Bulletin*, *117*(3), 497–529. https://doi.org/10.1037/0033-2909.117.3.497

Bazarova, N. N., Choi, Y. H., Sosik, V. S., Cosley, D., & Whitlock, J. (2015). *Social sharing of emotions on Facebook: Channel differences, satisfaction, and replies* [Conference session]. CSCW 2015—Proceedings of the 2015 ACM International Conference on Computer-Supported Cooperative Work and Social Computing, New York, NY, United States. https://doi.org/10.1145/2675133.2675297

Bernard, H., Burlingame, G., Flores, P., Greene, L., Joyce, A., Kobos, J. C., Leszcz, M., MacNair-Semands, R. R., Piper, W. E., McEneaney, A. M. S., & Feirman, D. (2008). Clinical practice guidelines for group psychotherapy. *International Journal of Group Psychotherapy*, *58*(4), 455–542. https://doi.org/10.1521/ijgp.2008.58.4.455

Bono, J. E., & Ilies, R. (2006). Charisma, positive emotions and mood contagion. *The Leadership*

This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.

Quarterly, *17*(4), 317–334. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.leaqua.2006.04.008

Boothby, E. J., Clark, M. S., & Bargh, J. A. (2014). Shared experiences are amplified. *Psychological Science*, *25*(12), 2209–2216. https://doi.org/10.1177/0956797614551162

Boothby, E. J., Smith, L. K., Clark, M. S., & Bargh, J. A. (2016). Psychological distance moderates the amplification of shared experience. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, *42*(10), 1431–1444. https://doi.org/10.1177/0146167216662869

Bordin, E. S. (1979). The generalizability of the psychoanalytic concept of the working alliance. *Psychotherapy*, *16*(3), 252–260. https://doi.org/10.1037/h0085885

Bui, L., Park, G., & Kuljanin, G. (2022). *A longitudinal study of team compassion, team integrative complexity, and team innovation* [Conference session]. Academy of Management Proceedings. https://doi.org/10.5465/AMBPP.2022.11660abstract

Bui, L., Park, G., & Wang, L. (2023). *An emergence perspective on team compassion: Theoretical and practical implications* [Manuscript in preparation]. The Australian National University.

Burlingame, G. M., Fuhriman, A., & Johnson, J. E. (2001). Cohesion in group psychotherapy. *Psychotherapy*, *38*(4), 373–379. https://doi.org/10.1037/0033-3204.38.4.373

Burlingame, G. M., & Strauss, B. (2021). Efficacy of small group treatments: Foundation for evidence-based practice. In W. Barkham, M. Lutz, & L. G. Castonguay (Eds.), *Bergin and Garfield's handbook of psychotherapy and behavior change* (6th ed., pp. 583–624). John Wiley.

Butler, E. A., Egloff, B., Wilhelm, F. H., Smith, N. C., Erickson, E. A., & Gross, J. J. (2003). The social consequences of expressive suppression. *Emotion*, *3*(1), 48–67. https://doi.org/10.1037/1528-3542.3.1.48

Cartwright, D. (1968). The nature of group cohesiveness. In D. Cartwright & A. Zander (Eds.), *Group dynamics: Theory and research* (pp. 91–109). Harper & Row.

Chang, L. J., Jolly, E., Cheong, J. H., Rapuano, K. M., Greenstein, N., Chen, P. A., & Manning, J. R. (2021). Endogenous variation in ventromedial prefrontal cortex state dynamics during naturalistic viewing reflects affective experience. *Science Advances*, *7*(17), Article eabf7129. https://doi.org/10.1126/sciadv.abf7129

Cheong, J. H., Molani, Z., Sadhukha, S., & Chang, L. (2020). *Synchronized affect in shared experiences strengthens social connection*. PsyArXiv. https://doi.org/10.31234/osf.io/bd9wn

Chiang, J. T. J., Chen, X. P., Liu, H., Akutsu, S., & Wang, Z. (2021). We have emotions but can't show them! Authoritarian leadership, emotion suppression climate, and team performance. *Human Relations*, *74*(7), 1082–1111. https://doi.org/10.1177/0018726720908649

Christophe, V., & Rimé, B. (1997). Exposure to the social sharing of emotion: Emotional impact, listener responses and secondary social sharing. *European Journal of Social Psychology*, *27*(1), 37–54. https://doi.org/10.1002/(SICI)1099-0992(199701)27:1<37::AID-EJSP806>3.0.CO;2-1

Cohen, S. (2004). Social relationships and health. *American Psychologist*, *59*(8), 676–684. https://doi.org/10.1037/0003-066X.59.8.676

Cohen, S., & Wills, T. A. (1985). Stress, social support, and the buffering hypothesis. *Psychological Bulletin*, *98*(2), 310–357. https://doi.org/10.1037/0033-2909.98.2.310

Coyne, A. E., Constantino, M. J., Laws, H. B., Westra, H. A., & Antony, M. M. (2018). Patient–therapist convergence in alliance ratings as a predictor of outcome in psychotherapy for generalized anxiety disorder. *Psychotherapy Research*, *28*(6), 969–984. https://doi.org/10.1080/10503307.2017.1303209

Crocker, J., & Canevello, A. (2008). Creating and undermining social support in communal relationships: The role of compassionate and self-image goals. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *95*(3), 555–575. https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.95.3.555

Curci, A., & Bellelli, G. (2004). Cognitive and social consequences of exposure to emotional narratives: Two studies on secondary social sharing of emotions. *Cognition and Emotion*, *18*(7), 881–900. https://doi.org/10.1080/02699930341000347

Delvaux, E., Meeussen, L., & Mesquita, B. (2016). Emotions are not always contagious: Longitudinal spreading of self-pride and group pride in homogeneous and status-differentiated groups. *Cognition and Emotion*, *30*(1), 101–116. https://doi.org/10.1080/02699931.2015.1018143

Delvaux, E., Vanbeselaere, N., & Mesquita, B. (2015). Dynamic interplay between norms and experiences of anger and gratitude in groups. *Small Group Research*, *46*(3), 300–323. https://doi.org/10.1177/1046496415576411

Duprez, C., Christophe, V., Rimé, B., Congard, A., & Antoine, P. (2015). Motives for the social sharing of an emotional experience. *Journal of Social and Personal Relationships*, *32*(6), 757–787. https://doi.org/10.1177/0265407514548393

Echterhoff, G., Higgins, E. T., & Levine, J. M. (2009). Shared reality: Experiencing commonality with others' inner states about the world. *Perspectives on Psychological Science*, *4*(5), 496–521. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1745-6924.2009.01161.x

Eid, M., & Diener, E. (2001). Norms for experiencing emotions in different cultures: Inter- and intranational differences. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *81*(5), 869–885. https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.81.5.869

This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.

Ekman, P. (1973). *Darwin and facial expression: A century of research in review*. Academic Press.

Elfenbein, H. A. (2007). Emotion in organizations. *The Academy of Management Annals*, *1*(1), 315–386. https://doi.org/10.5465/078559812

Elfenbein, H. A. (2014). The many faces of emotional contagion: An affective process theory of affective linkage. *Organizational Psychology Review*, *4*(4), 326–362. https://doi.org/10.1177/2041386614542889

Elfenbein, H. A. (2023). Emotion in organizations: Theory and research. *Annual Review of Psychology*, *74*(1), 489–517. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-psych-032720-035940

Emich, K. J. (2020). Well, I feel differently: The importance of considering affective patterns in groups. *Social and Personality Psychology Compass*, *14*(4), Article e12523. https://doi.org/10.1111/spc3.12523

Emich, K. J., & Lu, L. (2021). Mixed feelings: How shared and unshared affect impact team creative success. In A. S. McKay, R. Reiter-Palmon, & J. C. Kaufman (Eds.), *Creative success in teams* (pp. 145–166). Academic Press.

Endsley, M. R. (1995). Measurement of situation awareness in dynamic systems. *Human Factors*, *37*(1), 65–84. https://doi.org/10.1518/001872095779049499

Evans, N. J., & Jarvis, P. A. (1980). Group cohesion: A review and reevaluation. *Small Group Behavior*, *11*(4), 359–370. https://doi.org/10.1177/104649648001100401

Festinger, L. (1950). Informal social communication. *Psychological Review*, *57*(5), 271–282. https://doi.org/10.1037/h0056932

Festinger, L. (1954). A theory of social comparison processes. *Human Relations*, *7*(2), 117–140. https://doi.org/10.1177/001872675400700202

Fischer, A. H., & Manstead, A. S. (2008). Social functions of emotion. In M. Lewis, J. M. Haviland-Jones, & L. F. Barrett (Eds.), *Handbook of emotions* (3rd ed., pp. 456–468). Guilford Press.

Fisher, A. H., & Manstead, A. S. R. (2016). Social function of emotion and emotion regulation. In L. F. Barrett, M. Lewis, & J. M. Haviland-Jones (Eds.), *Handbook of emotions* (4th ed., pp. 424–439). Guilford Press.

Forsyth, D. R. (2018). *Group dynamics* (6th ed.). Cengage Learning.

Forsyth, D. R. (2021). Recent advances in the study of group cohesion. *Group Dynamics: Theory, Research, and Practice*, *25*(3), 213–228. https://doi.org/10.1037/gdn0000163

Fredrickson, B. L. (2003). Positive emotions and upward spirals in organizations. In K. S. Cameron, J. E. Dutton, & R. E. Quinn (Eds.), *Positive organizational scholarship* (pp. 163–175). Berrett-Koehler.

Frijda, N. H. (1986). *The emotions*. Cambridge University Press.

Frijda, N. H. (1993). Moods, emotion episodes, and emotions. In M. Lewis & J. M. Haviland (Eds.), *Handbook of emotions* (pp. 381–403). Guilford Press.

Gigone, D., & Hastie, R. (1993). The common knowledge effect: Information sharing and group judgment. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *65*(5), 959–974. https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.65.5.959

Goetz, J. L., Keltner, D., & Simon-Thomas, E. (2010). Compassion: An evolutionary analysis and empirical review. *Psychological Bulletin*, *136*(3), 351–374. https://doi.org/10.1037/a0018807

Goffman, E. (1969). The insanity of place. *Psychiatry*, *32*(4), 357–388. https://doi.org/10.1080/00332747.1969.11023600

Goldenberg, A., Garcia, D., Halperin, E., & Gross, J. J. (2020). Collective emotions. *Current Directions in Psychological Science*, *29*(2), 154–160. https://doi.org/10.1177/0963721420901574

Gross, J. J. (2001). Emotion regulation in adulthood: Timing is everything. *Current Directions in Psychological Science*, *10*(6), 214–219. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-8721.00152

Gross, J. J., & John, O. P. (2003). Individual differences in two emotion regulation processes: Implications for affect, relationships, and well-being. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *85*(2), 348–362. https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.85.2.348

Hardin, C. D., & Higgins, E. T. (1996). Shared reality: How social verification makes the subjective objective. In R. M. Sorrentino & E. T. Higgins (Eds.), *Handbook of motivation and cognition, Vol. 3. The interpersonal context* (pp. 28–84). Guilford Press.

Hareli, S., & Rafaeli, A. (2008). Emotion cycles: On the social influence of emotion in organizations. *Research in Organizational Behavior*, *28*, 35–59. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.riob.2008.04.007

Harrison, D. A., Mohammed, S., McGrath, J. E., Florey, A. T., & Vanderstoep, S. W. (2003). Time matters in team performance: Effects of member familiarity, entrainment, and task discontinuity on speed and quality. *Personnel Psychology*, *56*(3), 633–669. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1744-6570.2003.tb00753.x

Hatfield, E., Bensman, L., Thornton, P. D., & Rapson, R. L. (2014). New perspectives on emotional contagion: A review of classic and recent research on facial mimicry and contagion. *Interpersona: An International Journal on Personal Relationships*, *8*(2), 159–179. https://doi.org/10.5964/ijpr.v8i2.162

Hatfield, E., Cacioppo, J. T., & Rapson, R. L. (1994). *Emotional contagion*. Cambridge University Press.

This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.

Heerdink, M. W., van Kleef, G. A., Homan, A. C., & Fischer, A. H. (2013). On the social influence of emotions in groups: Interpersonal effects of anger and happiness on conformity versus deviance. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *105*(2), 262–284. https://doi.org/10.1037/a0033362

Heise, D. R., & O'Brien, J. (1993). Emotion expression in groups. In M. Lewis & J. M. Haviland (Eds.), *Handbook of emotions* (pp. 489–497). Guilford Press.

Henkel, J. M., & Hinsz, V. B. (2004). Success and failure in goal attainment as a mood induction procedure. *Social Behavior and Personality*, *32*(8), 715–722. https://doi.org/10.2224/sbp.2004.32.8.715

Hentschel, T., Shemla, M., Wegge, J., & Kearney, E. (2013). Perceived diversity and team functioning: The role of diversity beliefs and affect. *Small Group Research*, *44*(1), 33–61. https://doi.org/10.1177/1046496412470725

Hinsz, V. B. (1992). Social influences on the goal choices of group members. *Journal of Applied Social Psychology*, *22*(16), 1297–1317. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1559-1816.1992.tb00951.x

Hinsz, V. B. (1995a). Mental models of groups as social systems: Considerations of specification and assessment. *Small Group Research*, *26*(2), 200–233. https://doi.org/10.1177/1046496495262003

Hinsz, V. B. (1995b). Goal setting by groups performing an additive task: A comparison with individual goal setting. *Journal of Applied Social Psychology*, *25*(11), 965–990. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1559-1816.1995.tb02385.x

Hinsz, V. B. (2004). Metacognition and mental models in groups: An illustration with metamemory of group recognition memory. In E. Salas & S. M. Fiore (Eds.), *Team cognition: Understanding the factors that drive process and performance* (pp. 33–58). American Psychological Association. https://doi.org/10.1037/10690-003

Hinsz, V. B. (2009). *Cognitive consistency as a consequence of socially-shared cognition in groups* [Paper presentation]. Small Group Meeting of the European Association of Social Psychology on Cognitive Consistency, Kloster Bronnbach, Germany.

Hinsz, V. B. (2020). *The more the merrier, and one is the saddest number* [Unpublished data]. North Dakota State University.

Hinsz, V. B., Park, E., Leung, A. K., & Ladbury, J. (2019). Cultural disposition influences in workgroups: A motivational systems theory of group involvement perspective. *Small Group Research*, *50*(1), 81–137. https://doi.org/10.1177/1046496418797443

Hinsz, V. B., & Robinson, M. D. (2023). Conceptualizing mood influences on information processing in groups via dominant cognitive processing strategies. *Small Group Research*. Advance online publication. https://doi.org/10.1177/10464964231201102

Hinsz, V. B., Tindale, R. S., & Vollrath, D. A. (1997). The emerging conceptualization of groups as information processors. *Psychological Bulletin*, *121*(1), 43–64. https://doi.org/10.1037/0033-2909.121.1.43

Hoffman, M. L. (1985). Interaction of affect and cognition in empathy. In C. E. Izard, J. Kagan, & R. B. Zajonc (Eds.), *Emotions, cognition, and behavior* (pp. 103–131). Cambridge University Press.

Hogg, M. A., & Abrams, D. (1988). *Social identifications: A social psychology of intergroup relations and group processes*. Routledge.

Hogg, M. A., Terry, D. J., & White, K. M. (1995). A tale of two theories: A critical comparison of identity theory with social identity theory. *Social Psychology Quarterly*, *58*(4), 255–269. https://doi.org/10.2307/2787127

Hopfensitz, A., & Mantilla, C. (2019). Emotional expressions by sports teams: An analysis of World Cup soccer player portraits. *Journal of Economic Psychology*, *75*, Article 102071. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.joep.2018.04.008

Ilies, R., Wagner, D. T., & Morgeson, F. P. (2007). Explaining affective linkages in teams: Individual differences in susceptibility to contagion and individualism–collectivism. *Journal of Applied Psychology*, *92*(4), 1140–1148. https://doi.org/10.1037/0021-9010.92.4.1140

Janis, I. L. (1982). *Groupthink: Psychological studies of policy decisions and fiascoes*. Houghton Mifflin.

Jeong, S. S., & Korsgaard, M. A. (2022). Individual- and group-level consequences of divergence in perceived group affect. *Human Relations*, *75*(12), 2218–2245. https://doi.org/10.1177/00187267211038521

Johnson, S. K. (2008). I second that emotion: Effects of emotional contagion and affect at work on leader and follower outcomes. *The Leadership Quarterly*, *19*(1), 1–19. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.leaqua.2007.12.001

Kaplan, S., LaPort, K., & Waller, M. J. (2013). The role of positive affectivity in team effectiveness during crises. *Journal of Organizational Behavior*, *34*(4), 473–491. https://doi.org/10.1002/job.1817

Kelly, J. R. (2001). Mood and emotion in groups. In M. A. Hogg & S. Tindale (Eds.), *Blackwell handbook of social psychology: Group processes* (pp. 164–181). Wiley.

Kelly, J. R., & Barsade, S. G. (2001). Mood and emotions in small groups and work teams. *Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes*, *86*(1), 99–130. https://doi.org/10.1006/obhd.2001.2974

Kelly, J. R., & McGrath, J. E. (1985). Effects of time limits and task types on task performance and interaction of four-person groups. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *49*(2), 395–407. https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.49.2.395

This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.

Knight, A. P., & Eisenkraft, N. (2015). Positive is usually good, negative is not always bad: The effects of group affect on social integration and task performance. *Journal of Applied Psychology*, *100*(4), 1214–1227. https://doi.org/10.1037/apl0000006

Kozlowski, S. W. J., & Klein, K. J. (2000). A multilevel approach to theory and research in organizations: Contextual, temporal, and emergent processes. In K. J. Klein & S. W. J. Kozlowski (Eds.), *Multilevel theory, research, and methods in organizations: Foundations, extensions, and new directions* (pp. 3–90). Jossey-Bass. https://doi.org/10.1590/S1415-65552003000200014

Larsen, J. T., McGraw, A. P., & Cacioppo, J. T. (2001). Can people feel happy and sad at the same time? *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *81*(4), 684–696. https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.81.4.684

Larsen, R. J. (2000). Toward a science of mood regulation. *Psychological Inquiry*, *11*(3), 129–141. https://doi.org/10.1207/S15327965PLI1103_01

Latané, B., & Darley, J. M. (1969). Bystanders "apathy." *American Scientist*, *57*(2), 244–268.

Lazarus, R. S. (1991). *Emotion and adaptation*. Oxford University Press.

Leach, C. W., van Zomeren, M., Zebel, S., Vliek, M. L. W., Pennekamp, S. F., Doosje, B., Ouwerkerk, J. W., & Spears, R. (2008). Group-level self-definition and self-investment: A hierarchical (multicomponent) model of in-group identification. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *95*(1), 144–165. https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.95.1.144

Leavitt, H. J. (1974). Suppose we took groups seriously .... In E. L. Cass & F. G. Zimmer (Eds.), *Man and work in society* (pp. 67–77). Van Nostrand Reinhold.

LeBreton, J. M., & Senter, J. L. (2008). Answers to 20 questions about interrater reliability and interrater agreement. *Organizational Research Methods*, *11*(4), 815–852. https://doi.org/10.1177/1094428106296642

Leunissen, J. M. (2023). Diamonds and rust: The affective ambivalence of Nostalgia. *Current Opinion in Psychology*, *49*, Article 101541. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.copsyc.2022.101541

Levine, M., & Crowther, S. (2008). The responsive bystander: How social group membership and group size can encourage as well as inhibit bystander intervention. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *95*(6), 1429–1439. https://doi.org/10.1037/a0012634

Li, J., & van Knippenberg, D. (2021). The team causes and consequences of team membership change: A temporal perspective. *The Academy of Management Annals*, *15*(2), 577–606. https://doi.org/10.5465/annals.2019.0110

Lilius, J. M., Worline, M. C., Dutton, J. E., Kanov, J., & Maitlis, S. (2011). Understanding compassion capability. *Human Relations*, *64*(7), 873–899. https://doi.org/10.1177/0018726710396250

Lilius, J. M., Worline, M. C., Maitlis, S., Kanov, J., Dutton, J. E., & Frost, P. J. (2008). The contours and consequences of compassion at work. *Journal of Organizational Behavior*, *29*(2), 193–218. https://doi.org/10.1002/job.508

Lin, C., He, H., Baruch, Y., & Ashforth, B. E. (2017). The effect of team affective tone on team performance: The roles of team identification and team cooperation. *Human Resource Management*, *56*(6), 931–952. https://doi.org/10.1002/hrm.21810

Lin, C. W., Lin, C. S., Huang, P. C., & Wang, Y. L. (2014). How group efficacy mediates the relationship between group affect and identification. *Journal of Business Research*, *67*(7), 1388–1394. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jbusres.2013.08.014

Liu, W., Wang, F., & Liao, Z. (2021). Leader's anger and employee upward voice. In K. Z. Peng & C. H. Wui (Eds.), *Emotion and proactivity at work: Prospects and dialogues* (pp. 193–214). Bristol University Press. https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctv1ks0hcg.15

Lott, A. J., & Lott, B. E. (1965). Group cohesiveness as interpersonal attraction: A review of relationships with antecedent and consequent variables. *Psychological Bulletin*, *64*(4), 259–309. https://doi.org/10.1037/h0022386

MacKenzie, K. R. (1990). *Introduction to time-limited group psychotherapy*. American Psychiatric Publications.

Mackie, D. M., & Smith, E. R. (2015). Intergroup emotion. In M. Mikulincer, P. R. Shaver, J. F. Dovidio, & J. A. Simpson (Eds.), *APA handbook of personality and social psychology, Vol. 2. Group processes* (pp. 263–293). American Psychological Association. https://doi.org/10.1037/14342-010

Maitlis, S. (2005). The social processes of organizational sensemaking. *Academy of Management Journal*, *48*(1), 21–49. https://doi.org/10.5465/amj.2005.15993111

Manstead, A. S. R. (2010). Social psychology of emotion. In R. F. Baumeister & E. J. Finkel (Eds.), *Advanced social psychology: The state of the science* (pp. 101–137). Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.53841/bpsspr.2017.19.1.40

Marmarosh, C., Holtz, A., & Schottenbauer, M. (2005). Group cohesiveness, group-derived collective self-esteem, group-derived hope, and the well-being of group therapy members. *Group Dynamics: Theory, Research, and Practice*, *9*(1), 32–44. https://doi.org/10.1037/1089-2699.9.1.32

Marr, J. C., Thau, S., Aquino, K., & Barclay, L. J. (2012). Do I want to know? How the motivation to acquire relationship-threatening information in groups contributes to paranoid thought, suspicion behavior, and

This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.

social rejection. *Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes*, *117*(2), 285–297. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.obhdp.2011.11.003

Mathieu, J. E., Tannenbaum, S. I., Donsbach, J. S., & Alliger, G. M. (2014). A review and integration of team composition models: Moving toward a dynamic and temporal framework. *Journal of Management*, *40*(1), 130–160. https://doi.org/10.1177/0149206313503014

McGrath, J. E. (1984). *Groups: Interaction and performance*. Prentice-Hall.

McGrath, J. E. (1991). Time, interaction, and performance (TIP). *Small Group Research*, *22*(2), 147–174. https://doi.org/10.1177/1046496491222001

Menges, J. I., & Kilduff, M. (2015). Group emotions: Cutting the Gordian Knots concerning terms, levels of analysis, and processes. *The Academy of Management Annals*, *9*(1), 845–928. https://doi.org/10.5465/19416520.2015.1033148

Menges, J. I., Kilduff, M., Kern, S., & Bruch, H. (2015). The awestruck effect: Followers suppress emotion expression in response to charismatic but not individually considerate leadership. *The Leadership Quarterly*, *26*(4), 626–640. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.leaqua.2015.06.002

Mogan, R., Fischer, R., & Bulbulia, J. A. (2017). To be in synchrony or not? A meta-analysis of synchrony's effects on behavior, perception, cognition and affect. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*, *72*, 13–20. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jesp.2017.03.009

Moors, A., Ellsworth, P. C., Scherer, K. R., & Frijda, N. H. (2013). Appraisal theories of emotion: State of the art and future development. *Emotion Review*, *5*(2), 119–124. https://doi.org/10.1177/1754073912468165

Munyon, T. P., & Summers, J. K. (2023). Emotion, persuasion, and team adaptation: Advancing theory through cinema. *Academy of Management Review*. Advance online publication. https://doi.org/10.5465/amr.2022.0053

Niedenthal, P. M., & Brauer, M. (2012). Social functionality of human emotion. *Annual Review of Psychology*, *63*(1), 259–285. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.psych.121208.131605

Nils, F., & Rimé, B. (2012). Beyond the myth of venting: Social sharing modes determine the benefits of emotional disclosure. *European Journal of Social Psychology*, *42*(6), 672–681. https://doi.org/10.1002/ejsp.1880

Nowak, M. A., & Sigmund, K. (2005). Evolution of indirect reciprocity. *Nature*, *437*(7063), 1291–1298. https://doi.org/10.1038/nature04131

Nye, J. L., & Brower, A. M. (1996). *What's social about social cognition?* Sage Publications.

Ohly, S., & Schmitt, A. (2015). What makes us enthusiastic, angry, feeling at rest or worried? Development and validation of an affective work events taxonomy using concept mapping methodology. *Journal of Business and Psychology*, *30*(1), 15–35. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10869-013-9328-3

Osgood, C. E., Suci, G., & Tannenbaum, P. H. (1957). *The measurement of meaning*. University of Illinois Press.

Park, E. S., & Hinsz, V. B. (2006). "Strength and safety in numbers": A theoretical perspective on group influences on approach and avoidance motivation. *Motivation and Emotion*, *30*(2), 135–142. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11031-006-9024-y

Park, E. S., & Hinsz, V. B. (2015). Group interaction sustains positive moods and diminishes negative moods. *Group Dynamics: Theory, Research, and Practice*, *19*(4), 290–298. https://doi.org/10.1037/gdn0000034

Parkinson, B. (2012). Piecing together emotion: Sites and time-scales for social construction. *Emotion Review*, *4*(3), 291–298. https://doi.org/10.1177/1754073912439764

Parkinson, B. (2020). Intragroup emotion convergence: Beyond contagion and social appraisal. *Personality and Social Psychology Review*, *24*(2), 121–140. https://doi.org/10.1177/1088868319882596

Paulus, P. B., & Murdoch, P. (1971). Anticipated evaluation and audience presence in the enhancement of dominant responses. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*, *7*(3), 280–291. https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-1031(71)90028-X

Pescosolido, A. T. (2002). Emergent leaders as managers of group emotion. *The Leadership Quarterly*, *13*(5), 583–599. https://doi.org/10.1016/S1048-9843(02)00145-5

Piper, W. E., Ogrodniczuk, J. S., Lamarche, C., Hilscher, T., & Joyce, A. S. (2005). Level of alliance, pattern of alliance, and outcome in short-term group therapy. *International Journal of Group Psychotherapy*, *55*(4), 527–550. https://doi.org/10.1521/ijgp.2005.55.4.527

Pirola-Merlo, A., Härtel, C., Mann, L., & Hirst, G. (2002). How leaders influence the impact of affective events. *The Leadership Quarterly*, *13*(5), 561–581. https://doi.org/10.1016/S1048-9843(02)00144-3

Provine, R. R. (1992). Contagious laughter: Laughter is a sufficient stimulus for laughs and smiles. *Bulletin of the Psychonomic Society*, *30*(1), 1–4. https://doi.org/10.3758/BF03330380

Redl, F. (1942). Group emotion and leadership. *Psychiatry*, *5*(4), 573–596. https://doi.org/10.1080/00332747.1942.11022422

Reisenzein, R. (1994). Pleasure-arousal theory and the intensity of emotions. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *67*(3), 525–539. https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.67.3.525

Rimé, B. (2009). Emotion elicits the social sharing of emotion: Theory and empirical review. *Emotion*

This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.

Review, *1*(1), 60–85. https://doi.org/10.1177/1754073908097189

Rimé, B., Paez, D., Kanyangara, P., & Yzerbyt, V. (2011). The social sharing of emotions in interpersonal and in collective situations: Common psychosocial consequences. In I. Nykliček, A. Vingerhoets, & M. Zeelenberg (Eds.), *Emotion regulation and well-being* (pp. 147–163). Springer Science + Business Media. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4419-6953-8_9

Sacco, D. F., Bernstein, M. J., Young, S. G., & Hugenberg, K. (2014). Reactions to social inclusion and ostracism as a function of perceived in-group similarity. *Group Dynamics: Theory, Research, and Practice*, *18*(2), 129–137. https://doi.org/10.1037/gdn0000002

Salas, E., Prince, C., Baker, D. P., & Shrestha, L. (1995). Situation awareness in team performance: Implications for measurement and training. *Human Factors*, *37*(1), 123–136. https://doi.org/10.1518/001872095779049525

Salas, E., Shuffler, M. L., Thayer, A. L., Bedwell, W. L., & Lazzara, E. H. (2015). Understanding and improving teamwork in organizations: A scientifically based practical guide. *Human Resource Management*, *54*(4), 599–622. https://doi.org/10.1002/hrm.21628

Sawyer, K. B., & Clair, J. A. (2022). Hope cultures in organizations. *Administrative Science Quarterly*, *67*(2), 289–338. https://doi.org/10.1177/00018392211055506

Schachter, S. (1959). *The psychology of affiliation: Experimental studies of the sources of gregariousness*. Stanford University.

Scherer, K. R. (2009). The dynamic architecture of emotion: Evidence for the component process model. *Cognition and Emotion*, *23*(7), 1307–1351. https://doi.org/10.1080/02699930902928969

Scherer, K. R., Schorr, A., & Johnstone, T. (2001). *Appraisal processes in emotion: Theory, methods, research*. Oxford University Press.

Schwarz, N., & Clore, G. L. (1983). Mood, misattribution, and judgments of well-being: Informative and directive functions of affective states. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *45*(3), 513–523. https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.45.3.513

Shrout, P. E., & Fleiss, J. L. (1979). Intraclass correlations: Uses in assessing rater reliability. *Psychological Bulletin*, *86*(2), 420–428. https://doi.org/10.1037/0033-2909.86.2.420

Shteynberg, G., Hirsh, J. B., Galinsky, A. D., & Knight, A. P. (2014). Shared attention increases mood infusion. *Journal of Experimental Psychology: General*, *143*(1), 123–130. https://doi.org/10.1037/a0031549

Simon, B., & Pettigrew, T. F. (1990). Social identity and perceived group homogeneity: Evidence for the ingroup homogeneity effect. *European Journal of Social Psychology*, *20*(4), 269–286. https://doi.org/10.1002/ejsp.2420200402

Smith, E. R., Seger, C. R., & Mackie, D. M. (2007). Can emotions be truly group level? Evidence regarding four conceptual criteria. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *93*(3), 431–446. https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.93.3.431

Sorce, J. F., Emde, R. N., Campos, J., & Klinnert, M. D. (1985). Maternal emotional signaling. Its effect on the visual cliff behavior of 1-year-olds. *Developmental Psychology*, *21*(1), 195–200. https://doi.org/10.1037/0012-1649.21.1.195

Spoor, J. R., & Kelly, J. R. (2004). The evolutionary significance of affect in groups: Communication and group bonding. *Group Processes & Intergroup Relations*, *7*(4), 398–412. https://doi.org/10.1177/1368430204046145

Stasser, G., & Titus, W. (1987). Effects of information load and percentage of shared information on the dissemination of unshared information during group discussion. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *53*(1), 81–93. https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.53.1.81

Steiner, I. D. (1972). *Group process and productivity*. Academic Press.

Stellar, J. E., Gordon, A. M., Piff, P. K., Cordaro, D., Anderson, C. L., Bai, Y., Maruskin, L. A., & Keltner, D. (2017). Self-transcendent emotions and their social functions: Compassion, gratitude, and awe bind us to others through prosociality. *Emotion Review*, *9*(3), 200–207. https://doi.org/10.1177/1754073916684557

Stokes, J. P. (1983). Components of group cohesion: Intermember attraction, instrumental value, and risk taking. *Small Group Behavior*, *14*(2), 163–173. https://doi.org/10.1177/104649648301400203

Sullins, E. S. (1991). Emotional contagion revisited: Effects of social comparison and expressive style on mood convergence. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, *17*(2), 166–174. https://doi.org/10.1177/014616729101700208

Sy, T., & Choi, J. N. (2013). Contagious leaders and followers: Exploring multi-stage mood contagion in a leader activation and member propagation (LAMP) model. *Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes*, *122*(2), 127–140. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.obhdp.2013.06.003

Sy, T., Choi, J. N., & Johnson, S. K. (2013). Reciprocal interactions between group perceptions of leader charisma and group mood through mood contagion. *The Leadership Quarterly*, *24*(4), 463–476. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.leaqua.2013.02.002

Sy, T., Côté, S., & Saavedra, R. (2005). The contagious leader: Impact of the leader's mood on the mood of group members, group affective tone, and group processes. *Journal of Applied Psychology*, *90*(2), 295–305. https://doi.org/10.1037/0021-9010.90.2.295

This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.

Tajfel, H. (1974). Social identity and intergroup behaviour. *Social Science Information*, *13*(2), 65–93. https://doi.org/10.1177/053901847401300204

Tanghe, J., Wisse, B., & van der Flier, H. (2010). The formation of group affect and team effectiveness: The moderating role of identification. *British Journal of Management*, *21*(2), 340–358. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8551.2009.00656.x

Tedeschi, E., Armand, S., Buyalskaya, A., Silston, B., & Mobbs, D. (2021). Fear in groups: Increasing group size reduces perceptions of danger. *Emotion*, *21*(7), 1499–1510. https://doi.org/10.1037/emo0001004

Thompson, L., & Fine, G. A. (1999). Socially shared cognition, affect, and behavior: A review and integration. *Personality and Social Psychology Review*, *3*(4), 278–302. https://doi.org/10.1207/s15327957pspr0304_1

Tiedens, L. Z., Sutton, R. I., & Fong, C. T. (2004). Emotional variation in work groups. In L. Z. Tiedens & C. W. Leach (Eds.), *The social life of emotions* (pp. 164–186). Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511819568.010

Tindale, R. S., & Kameda, T. (2000). 'Social sharedness' as a unifying theme for information processing in groups. *Group Processes & Intergroup Relations*, *3*(2), 123–140. https://doi.org/10.1177/1368430200003002002

Tindale, R. S., Smith, C. M., Thomas, L. S., Filkins, J., & Sheffey, S. (1996). Shared representations and asymmetric social influence processes in small groups. In J. H. Davis & E. H. Witte (Eds.), *Understanding group behavior: Consensual action by small groups* (pp. 81–103). Taylor & Francis Group.

Totterdell, P. (2000). Catching moods and hitting runs: Mood linkage and subjective performance in professional sport teams. *Journal of Applied Psychology*, *85*(6), 848–859. https://doi.org/10.1037/0021-9010.85.6.848

Totterdell, P., Kellett, S., Teuchmann, K., & Briner, R. B. (1998). Evidence of mood linkage in work groups. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *74*(6), 1504–1515. https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.74.6.1504

Trivers, R. L. (1971). The evolution of reciprocal altruism. *The Quarterly Review of Biology*, *46*(1), 35–57. https://doi.org/10.1086/406755

Turner, J. C. (1985). Social categorization and the self-concept: A social cognitive theory of group behavior. In E. J. Lawler (Ed.), *Advances in group processes: Theory and research* (Vol. 2, pp. 77–121). JAI Press.

van der Vegt, G. S., Bunderson, S., & Kuipers, B. (2010). Why turnover matters in self-managing work teams: Learning, social integration, and task flexibility. *Journal of Management*, *36*(5), 1168–1191. https://doi.org/10.1177/0149206309344117

van Kleef, G. A. (2009). How emotions regulate social life: The emotions as social information (EASI) model. *Current Directions in Psychological Science*, *18*(3), 184–188. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8721.2009.01633.x

van Kleef, G. A. (2016). *The interpersonal dynamics of emotion: Toward an integrative theory of emotions as social information*. Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781107261396

van Kleef, G. A., & Fischer, A. H. (2016). Emotional collectives: How groups shape emotions and emotions shape groups. *Cognition and Emotion*, *30*(1), 3–19. https://doi.org/10.1080/02699931.2015.1081349

van Kleef, G. A., Heerdink, M. W., & Homan, A. C. (2017). Emotional influence in groups: The dynamic nexus of affect, cognition, and behavior. *Current Opinion in Psychology*, *17*, 156–161. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.copsyc.2017.07.017

van Kleef, G. A., Homan, A. C., Beersma, B., Van Knippenberg, D., Van Knippenberg, B., & Damen, F. (2009). Searing sentiment or cold calculation? The effects of leader emotional displays on team performance depend on follower epistemic motivation. *Academy of Management Journal*, *52*(3), 562–580. https://doi.org/10.5465/amj.2009.41331253

Vinogradov, S., & Yalom, I. D. (1990). Self-disclosure in group psychotherapy. In G. Strickler & M. Fisher (Eds.), *Self-disclosure in the therapeutic relationship* (pp. 191–204). Springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4899-3582-3_13

Wageman, R. (1995). Interdependence and group effectiveness. *Administrative Science Quarterly*, *40*(1), 145–180. https://doi.org/10.2307/2393703

Wang, L., Park, G., Bui, L., & Hinsz, V. B. (2023). *Team emotion: An integrative conceptual and empirical review* [Manuscript in preparation]. University of Alberta.

Watson, D. (2000). *Mood and temperament*. Guilford Press.

Watson, D., Clark, L. A., & Tellegen, A. (1988). Development and validation of brief measures of positive and negative affect: The PANAS scales. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *54*(6), 1063–1070. https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.54.6.1063

Weick, K. E., Sutcliffe, K. M., & Obstfeld, D. (2005). Organizing and the process of sensemaking. *Organization Science*, *16*(4), 409–421. https://doi.org/10.1287/orsc.1050.0133

Weiss, H. M., & Cropanzano, R. (1996). Affective Events Theory: A theoretical discussion of the structure, causes and consequences of affective experiences at work. In B. M. Staw & L. L. Cummings (Eds.), *Research in organizational behavior: An annual series of analytical essays and critical reviews* (Vol. 18, pp. 1–74). Elsevier Science/JAI Press.

This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.

Wittenbaum, G. M., & Park, E. S. (2001). The collective preference for shared information. *Current Directions in Psychological Science*, *10*(2), 70–73. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-8721.00118

Wolf, S. A., Heerdink, M. W., & van Kleef, G. A. (2023). A motivational account of convergence in emotion expressions within groups: The emotional conformity framework. *Emotion Review*. Advance online publication. https://doi.org/10.1177/17540739231182241

Wrzesniewski, A., Dutton, J. E., & Debebe, G. (2003). Interpersonal sensemaking and the meaning of work. *Research in Organizational Behavior*, *25*, 93–135. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0191-3085(03)25003-6

Yalom, I. D., & Leszcz, M. (2020). *The theory and practice of group psychotherapy*. Basic Books/Hachette Book Group.

Zajonc, R. B. (1965). Social facilitation. *Science*, *149*(3681), 269–274. https://doi.org/10.1126/science.149.3681.269

Zajonc, R. B. (1980). Compresence. In P. B. Paulus (Ed.), *Psychology of group influence* (pp. 35–60). Lawrence Erlbaum.


Zander, A., & Armstrong, W. (1972). Working for group pride in a slipper factory. *Journal of Applied Social Psychology*, *2*(4), 293–307. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1559-1816.1972.tb01281.x

Zellmer-Bruhn, M., Waller, M. J., & Ancona, D. (2004). The effect of temporal entrainment on the ability of teams to change their routines. In S. Blount (Ed.), *Time in groups* (Research on Managing Groups and Teams, Vol. 6, pp. 135–158). Emerald Group Publishing. https://doi.org/10.1016/S1534-0856(03)06007-9

Zillmann, D. (1979). *Hostility and aggression*. Erlbaum.


Received June 8, 2023
Revision received August 7, 2023
Accepted August 8, 2023 ■

This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.



Statement of Ownership, Management, and Circulation (All Periodicals Publications Except Requester Publications)


1. Publication Title: Group Dynamics: Theory, Research, and Practice
2. Publication Number: 0 0 1 – 1 0 6
3. Filing Date: September 2023
4. Issue Frequency: Quarterly
5. Number of Issues Published Annually: 4
6. Annual Subscription Price: Mbr $106 Indiv $165 Inst $925
7. Complete Mailing Address of Known Office of Publication (Not printer) (Street, city, county, state, and ZIP+4®): 750 First Street, NE, Washington, DC 20002-4242
Contact Person: Leon Hawkins
Telephone (Include area code): (202) 414-8076
8. Complete Mailing Address of Headquarters or General Business Office of Publisher (Not printer): 750 First Street, NE, Washington, DC 20002-4242
9. Full Names and Complete Mailing Addresses of Publisher, Editor, and Managing Editor (Do not leave blank)
Publisher (Name and complete mailing address): American Psychological Association, 750 First Street, NE, Washington, DC 20002-4242
Editor (Name and complete mailing address): Giorgio A. Tasca, Department of Psychology, University of Ottawa, 145 Jean-Jacques Lussier, Ottawa, Ontario, K1N6N5, Canada
Managing Editor (Name and complete mailing address): Rose Sokol, American Psychological Association, 750 First Street, NE, Washington, DC 20002-4242
10. Owner (Do not leave blank. If the publication is owned by a corporation, give the name and address of the corporation immediately followed by the names and addresses of all stockholders owning or holding 1 percent or more of the total amount of stock. If not owned by a corporation, give the names and addresses of the individual owners. If owned by a partnership or other unincorporated firm, give its name and address as well as those of each individual owner. If the publication is published by a nonprofit organization, give its name and address.)
Full Name: American Psychological Association
Complete Mailing Address: 750 First Street, NE, Washington, DC 20002-4242
11. Known Bondholders, Mortgagees, and Other Security Holders Owning or Holding 1 Percent or More of Total Amount of Bonds, Mortgages, or Other Securities. If none, check box → ☐ None
Full Name / Complete Mailing Address
12. Tax Status (For completion by nonprofit organizations authorized to mail at nonprofit rates) (Check one)
The purpose, function, and nonprofit status of this organization and the exempt status for federal income tax purposes:
☐ Has Not Changed During Preceding 12 Months
☐ Has Changed During Preceding 12 Months (Publisher must submit explanation of change with this statement)
PS Form 3526, July 2014 (Page 1 of 4 (see instructions page 4)) PSN: 7530-01-000-9931 PRIVACY NOTICE: See our privacy policy on www.usps.com



13. Publication Title: Group Dynamics: Theory, Research, and Practice
14. Issue Date for Circulation Data Below: September 2023

15. Extent and Nature of Circulation			Average No. Copies Each Issue During Preceding 12 Months	No. Copies of Single Issue Published Nearest to Filing Date
a. Total Number of Copies (Net press run)			244	263
b. Paid Circulation (By Mail and Outside the Mail)	(1)	Mailed Outside-County Paid Subscriptions Stated on PS Form 3541 (Include paid distribution above nominal rate, advertiser's proof copies, and exchange copies)	139	144
	(2)	Mailed In-County Paid Subscriptions Stated on PS Form 3541 (Include paid distribution above nominal rate, advertiser's proof copies, and exchange copies)		
	(3)	Paid Distribution Outside the Mails Including Sales Through Dealers and Carriers, Street Vendors, Counter Sales, and Other Paid Distribution Outside USPS®	10	12
	(4)	Paid Distribution by Other Classes of Mail Through the USPS (e.g., First-Class Mail®)	1	1
c. Total Paid Distribution (Sum of 15b (1), (2), (3), and (4))			150	157
d. Free or Nominal Rate Distribution (By Mail and Outside the Mail)	(1)	Free or Nominal Rate Outside-County Copies included on PS Form 3541		
	(2)	Free or Nominal Rate In-County Copies Included on PS Form 3541		
	(3)	Free or Nominal Rate Copies Mailed at Other Classes Through the USPS (e.g., First-Class Mail)		
	(4)	Free or Nominal Rate Distribution Outside the Mail (Carriers or other means)	1	1
e. Total Free or Nominal Rate Distribution (Sum of 15d (1), (2), (3) and (4))			1	1
f. Total Distribution (Sum of 15c and 15e)			151	158
g. Copies not Distributed (See Instructions to Publishers #4 (page #3))			93	105
h. Total (Sum of 15f and g)			244	263
i. Percent Paid (15c divided by 15f times 100)			99.34%	99.37%

2 If you are claiming electronic copies, go to line 16 on page 3. If you are not claiming electronic copies, skip to line 17 on page 3.
PS Form 3526, July 2014 (Page 2 of 4)



Statement of Ownership, Management, and Circulation (All Periodicals Publications Except Requester Publications)

16. Electronic Copy Circulation	Average No. Copies Each Issue During Preceding 12 Months	No. Copies of Single Issue Published Nearest to Filing Date
a. Paid Electronic Copies		
b. Total Paid Print Copies (Line 15c) + Paid Electronic Copies (Line 16a)	150	157
c. Total Print Distribution (Line 15f) + Paid Electronic Copies (Line 16a)	151	158
d. Percent Paid (Both Print & Electronic Copies) (16b divided by 16c × 100)	99.34%	99.37%

☐ I certify that 50% of all my distributed copies (electronic and print) are paid above a nominal price.

17. Publication of Statement of Ownership
■ If the publication is a general publication, publication of this statement is required. Will be printed in the December 2023 issue of this publication. ☐ Publication not required.
18. Signature and Title of Editor, Publisher, Business Manager, or Owner: Leon Hawkins, APA Circulation Manager — Date: 9/29/2023
I certify that all information furnished on this form is true and complete. I understand that anyone who furnishes false or misleading information on this form or who omits material or information requested on the form may be subject to criminal sanctions (including fines and imprisonment) and/or civil sanctions (including civil penalties).
PS Form 3526, July 2014 (Page 3 of 4) PRIVACY NOTICE: See our privacy policy on www.usps.com